Washington and Lee Law Review
Volume 74

Issue 1

Article 5

1-1-2017

Recasting Vagueness: The Case of Teen Sex Statutes
Cynthia Godsoe
Brooklyn Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr
Part of the Criminal Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Cynthia Godsoe, Recasting Vagueness: The Case of Teen Sex Statutes, 74 Wash. & Lee L. Rev.
173 (2017).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol74/iss1/5
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington and
Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law
Review by an authorized editor of Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more
information, please contact christensena@wlu.edu.

Recasting Vagueness: The Case of Teen
Sex Statutes
Cynthia Godsoe*
Abstract
When two minors below the age of consent have sex, who is the
victim and who is the offender? Statutory rape law makes
consensual sex among minors illegal in almost every state. Where
half of high school students have had intercourse, the law’s
immense scope and inevitable underenforcement allow prosecutors
to virtually define the crime by the tiny percentage of cases they
choose. Through the lens of peer statutory rape, this Article
introduces and critiques “vaguenets”—broad, under-defined laws
that punish widespread and largely harmless conduct, and invite
selective enforcement. Like problematic police dragnet searches,
the immense sweep of these statutes ensnares much innocent
conduct in an effort to root out societal undesirables. For sexually
active adolescents, this means disproportionately those breaching
heterocentric or racialized gender norms.
This Article brings juveniles into an overcriminalization
conversation that has largely ignored them. It also takes a fresh
look at a potential tool to curb the punitive state—the
constitutional vagueness doctrine. While several scholars
recognized vagueness’ historic use as cover for judicial
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consideration of equality and liberty concerns in the vagrancy
cases, contemporary overcriminalization scholars have forgotten
this potential. This Article charts the doctrine’s past use to halt
excessive moralizing via the criminal law and its revitalization by
recent Supreme Court cases, and argues that vagueness, in letter
or spirit, can serve as a blueprint for much needed criminal justice
reform. It concludes with one such reform, recommending the
decriminalization of all consensual peer sex under the age of
sixteen.
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I. Introduction
When two minors below the age of consent have sex, who is
the victim and who is the offender? No one can agree. Consider
these two recent cases: In the first, four or five middle school boys
and girls had consensual1 oral sex and vaginal intercourse at a
“sex party.”2 The police arrested and charged all the minors.3 The
second case concerned two preteen boys who had consensual anal
sex several times.4 After one boy’s father complained to the police,
the other boy was adjudicated guilty of statutory rape and
sentenced to suspended incarceration, probation for an indefinite
number of years, and sex offender treatment.5 Statutory rape law
makes consensual sexual activity among minors illegal in almost
every state.6 At the same time, sex among minors is extremely
1. Because age-based consent is a legal fiction, here I use consensual “in
its conventional, rather than legal, sense.” In re ZC, 165 P.3d 1206, 1207 n.1
(Utah 2007). The average age of consent is sixteen years old. See generally infra
Appendix A.
2. See Four Brown Deer Middle Schoolers Face Sexual Assault Charges
After ‘Sex Party’, WISN, http://www.wisn.com/news/four-brown-deer-middleschoolers-face-sexual-assault-charges-aftersex-party/30973722 (last updated
Jan. 29, 2015) (last visited Mar. 6, 2017) (“Four Brown Deer middle school
students are facing sex assault charges after recording themselves at a so-called
sex party.”) (hereinafter Four Brown Deer) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
3. See id. (explaining that four teens were arrested at the scene and may
be charged).
4. See In re D.B., 950 N.E.2d 528, 530 (Ohio 2011) (“A.W. testified that he
had observed D.B. and M.G. engage in anal sex.”).
5. See id. at 530–31 (explaining that the trial court convicted D.B. on
multiple counts and was sentenced, but without evidence of force during any
act, D.B. was acquitted on other counts).
6. Statutory rape is “consensual sexual relations with an individual not
old enough to legally consent to the behavior.” KARYL TROUP-LEASURE & HOWARD
N. SNYDER, OJJDP JUVENILE JUSTICE BULLETIN, STATUTORY RAPE KNOWN TO LAW
ENFORCEMENT 2 (Aug. 2005), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/208803.pdf.
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widespread—almost half of all high school students have had
intercourse, millions of younger children have as well, and many
minors of all ages have engaged in oral sex and other sexual
The
law’s
immense
scope
and
requisite
activity.7
underenforcement give police and prosecutors the power to
virtually define the crime.8
In this Article, I identify and critique “vaguenets”—broad
and under-defined laws that invite selective enforcement.9
Vaguenets criminalize harmless conduct or conduct bringing
some harm, where the costs of criminalization outweigh the
benefits.10 The scope of covered conduct means that
underenforcement is inevitable, as is a vast gap between the law
on the books and the law in action. Historic examples include
State statutes vary widely, but the vast majority criminalize consensual sex
between some parties below the age of consent. Infra Appendices A & B. I use
minors, children, and adolescents interchangeably to indicate someone below
the age of consent.
7. See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., YOUTH RISK BEHAVIOR SURVEILLANCE—UNITED STATES, 2013 24
(2013), http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/pdf/ss/ss6304.pdf [hereinafter CDC] (providing
that 46.8% of high school students have had sex, 5.6% of those students before
age thirteen); GUTTMACHER INST., AMERICAN TEENS’ SEXUAL AND REPRODUCTIVE
HEALTH (2014), http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/FB-ATSRH.pdf (reviewing data
and trends in teen sexual behavior throughout the country).
8. See Samuel W. Buell, The Upside of Overbreadth, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1491, 1492 (2008) [hereinafter Buell, The Upside of Overbreadth] (“These [overly
broad] codes are so deep, redundant, and larded with excessive penalties that
they have effectively delegated to the executive branch actors the power to
determine the true content of the criminal law through enforcement
practices . . . .”).
9. Named after a fishing net, dragnet searches are group or location-based
searches based on generalized government interest rather than individualized
suspicion. See Eve Brensike Primus, Disentangling Administrative Searches,
111 COLUM. L. REV. 254, 263 (2011) (“[I]t is the distinguishing characteristic of a
dragnet to be general, to reach everyone in a category rather than only a chosen
few.”). As such, they have been found to violate the Fourth Amendment. See id.
at 263–74 (evaluating various cases involving dragnet searches). I use “breadth”
here to describe the scope of statutes, not to refer to the overbreadth doctrine.
Although the vagueness and overbreadth doctrines are intertwined, overbreadth
is limited to the First Amendment context. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 859–61, 1030–31 (2d ed. 1988) (distinguishing between the
overbreadth and vagueness doctrines).
10. See Buell, The Upside of Overbreadth, supra note 8, at 1492 (“[A]n
overbroad law [might] create worries about sunk costs in the form of wasteful
overdeterrence, needless enforcement expenses, and the opportunity for
discrimination and caprice by state actors . . . .”).
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bans on vagrancy and loitering; more recent examples include
crimes such as marijuana possession and music piracy.11
Vaguenets cannot be solved by clarifying the statutory language,
in part because, as I elaborate further in Part II, the
constitutional vagueness doctrine is not solely or even mostly
about clarity of language. Instead, the problem with vague
statutes run much deeper; these laws sometimes criminalize
based on inappropriate criteria, thus threatening the rule of law
itself.12 Accordingly, as Robert Post aptly noted about vagrancy
laws, they “cannot simply be rewritten . . . [but] must instead be
refashioned to reflect entirely alternative models of social life.”13
Sometimes this refashioning will be a full decriminalization of
the conduct, as happened with vagrancy.14
Peer statutory rape, or the criminalization of consensual sex
between minors, is a particularly good lens into the overcriminalization problem vaguenets present. The immense pool of
law-breakers, lack of a mens rea requirement in most
jurisdictions, gap between empirics and morality about
adolescent sex, and severe sanctions and stigma accorded to sex
offenders combine to make statutory rape one of the most
punitive of these laws.15 This is compounded by the victim11. See DOUGLAS N. HUSAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION: THE LIMITS OF THE
CRIMINAL LAW 29–30, 170–73 (2008) [hereinafter HUSAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION]
(demonstrating how the enforcement of drug laws and gun control laws has led
to issues of proportionality in sentencing and overinclusion); Alexandra
Natapoff, Underenforcement, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1715, 1741–43 (2006) (listing
laws against marijuana possession and music piracy as examples of
underenforced laws).
12. See Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 171 (1972)
(“[T]he rule of law implies equality and justice in its application. Vagrancy laws
of the Jacksonville type teach that the scales of justice are so tipped that evenhanded administration of the law is not possible.”).
13. Robert C. Post, Reconceptualizing Vagueness: Legal Rules and Social
Orders, 82 CAL. L. REV. 491, 492 (1994) [hereinafter Post, Reconceptualizing
Vagueness]. Of course, Post does not use the term vaguenets to refer to the laws,
but vagrancy laws fit my definition of vaguenets.
14. For a valuable history of this watershed, see RISA GOLUBOFF, VAGRANT
NATION: POLICE POWER, CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND THE MAKING OF THE 1960S
(2016) [hereinafter GOLUBOFF, VAGRANT NATION] (linking vagrancy laws to the
civil rights, peace, gay rights, welfare rights, sexual, and cultural revolutions).
15. Here I use overcriminalization to mean too much criminal law, too
broad a potential group of offenders, and too much and excessively harsh
punishment. See infra Part II.A and accompanying text (discussing the epidemic
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offender overlap, or the fact that minors are defined by statute as
both potential victims and potential offenders.16 When the
overlap is built into the law, as with peer statutory rape, this
important distinction becomes like the popular optical illusion of
two women—from one perspective the picture is of a young,
beautiful woman, from the other an old “hag.”17 Lacking any
legislative distinction between legal and illegal conduct,
prosecutors may pick and choose based on ad hoc and subjective
factors, hiding any substantive commitments beneath the
immense shield of statutory rape law.18 Just as race and poverty
have driven vagrancy and marijuana possession prosecutions,
peer statutory rape prosecutions are sometimes based on the
similarly illegitimate criteria of traditional gender roles and an
ongoing distaste for same-sex intimacy.19
Two
broader
contributions
to
the
dialogue
on
overcriminalization come from this examination of peer statutory
rape. Building on the seminal account of William Stuntz, a rich
literature expounds the harms of our carceral state and explores
solutions.20 This attention, however, has largely overlooked both
of overcriminalization in the United States).
16. Criminologists define the victim-offender overlap as “the strong
empirical and theoretical relationship between victimization and the
perpetration of crime and delinquency.” Jennifer M. Reingle, The
Victim-Offender Overlap, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY
911 (2014) [hereinafter Reingle, The Victim-Offender Overlap].
17. See Young Lady or an Old Hag?!, MIGHTY OPTICAL ILLUSIONS (May 21,
2006), http://www.moillusions.com/young-lady-or-old-hag (last visited Oct. 18,
2016) (depicting the illusion of an image appearing to be both a young lady and
an old woman) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
18. See Buell, The Upside of Overbreadth, supra note 8, at 1496 (“[B]road
prohibitions confer wide authority on prosecutors to use their charging decisions
and plea bargaining practices to determine the true content of the criminal
law.”). I use the term “selective enforcement” here to describe enforcement on
illegitimate grounds unrelated to culpability.
19. Although there is no available data, experts agree that same-sex
conduct is likely disproportionately punished. See CAROLYN E. COCCA, JAILBAIT
130 (2004) [hereinafter COCCA, JAILBAIT] (“The implications for policies
grounded in disparate constructions of gender and sexuality appear to be that
policy implementation will be uneven.”); see also infra Part III.A.2.a and
accompanying text (arguing that statutory rape laws stigmatize and
disproportionately affect LGBTQ children).
20. See, e.g., HUSAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION, supra note 11, at 132–33
(developing a “test of criminalization” involving three separate inquiries); Sara
Sun Beale, The Many Faces of Overcriminalization: From Morals and Mattress
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a site of, and a potential tool to address, these harms—the harsh
systemic punishment of juveniles and the vagueness doctrine and
its underlying principles.
First, most explorations of overcriminalization have focused
on federal law, ignoring the prosecution and punishment of even
very young minors.21 Although numerous commentators have
aptly critiqued the juvenile justice system, a literature I draw
upon here,22 these critiques have been largely siloed, with
overcriminalization scholars and juvenile justice scholars rarely
in conversation. Yet, they have much to offer each other. The
informal structure and paternalistic mandate of the juvenile
justice
system
have
led
to
particularly
robust
overcriminalization.23 The punishment for statutory rape of even
very young children reflects this—in 2012 alone, 40 children
under ten years old and 461 children under sixteen were
adjudicated guilty of this offense designed to protect them.24
Tags to Overfederalization, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 747, 749 (2005) [hereinafter Beale,
Overcriminalization] (listing “excessive unchecked discretion,” “disparity among
similarly situated persons,” “potential to undermine other significant values,”
and “misdirection of scarce resources” as some of the harms of
overcriminalization); William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal
Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 511 (2001) [hereinafter Stuntz, Pathological
Politics] (exploring ways to solve the problem of overcriminalization, for
example, by abolishing enforcement discretion and “end[ing] legislatures’ ability
to decide how far criminal law’s net should extend”).
21. The cases discussed herein are mostly delinquency cases in the juvenile
justice system. Despite different nomenclature, there are many similarities to
the criminal justice system. Numerous scholars have noted the demise (or
non-existence?) of the juvenile justice system’s rehabilitative purpose. See, e.g.,
Martin Guggenheim, Graham v. Florida and A Juvenile’s Right to
Age-Appropriate Sentencing, 47 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 457, 487 (2012)
(“Americans [no] longer take seriously the Progressive ideal that the juvenile
justice system does not punish young offenders, least of all that the amount of
punishment ought to have nothing to do with what the young person did.”).
Accordingly, I argue that both systems, and related quasi-criminal systems such
as the status offender system, are inappropriate tools for regulating peer
sexuality.
22. See infra notes 108–109, 121, 126 and accompanying text (asserting
that the juvenile justice system often imposes longer sentences on juveniles
than adults, disproportionately affects minorities, and more frequently punishes
girls for victimless crime).
23. See infra Part II.B.1 (explaining that deliberately vast discretion and
the absence of checks on that discretion, like juries, have led to
overcriminalization).
24. See FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SEX OFFENSE
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Thousands more were arrested or charged on related grounds.25
The consequences can include incarceration and sex offender
registry.26 These harms are magnified by minors’ diminished
culpability
and
increased
vulnerability.27
The
same
characteristics, however, render minors an appealing group for
reform who could function as a wedge for broader
decriminalization efforts.28
In this account, I also challenge a widely held view of the
vagueness doctrine as ineffective or even counterproductive as a
curb on the criminal justice system’s excesses.29 Vagueness
doctrine guards against inadequate notice, and arbitrary or
selective enforcement, with the latter being the primary
concern.30 Courts and commentators often interpret the doctrine
OFFENDERS, STATUTORY RAPE, SEX AND RACE BY AGE, 2012 (2012),
https://ucr.fbi.gov/nibrs/2012/table-pdfs/sex-offense-offenders-statutory-rape-sexand-race-by-age-2012 (breaking down all statutory rape offenses in 2012 by age,
race, and sex).
25. See id. (comparing total arrests with guilty convictions).
26. See infra Part II.B.2 (discussing the wide variety of disciplinary options
available to prosecutors in statutory rape cases).
27. The Supreme Court has recognized these differences in a recent line of
cases. See, e.g., Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2460 (2012) (holding that
mandatory life imprisonment without parole for those who are minors at the
time of their crime violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and
unusual punishment); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 74 (2010) (prohibiting
life imprisonment for minors who have not committed homicide and requiring
the state to give minors a “meaningful opportunity” to obtain release); Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005) (finding that the execution of individuals
who committed their crime when they were minors violated the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments).
28. Indeed, they are already serving as such in some contexts. For instance,
President Obama recently recognized youth’s difference in banning solitary
confinement for juveniles in federal prisons. See Michael D. Shearjan, Obama
Bans Solitary Confinement of Juveniles in Federal Prisons, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25,
2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/26/us/politics/obama-bans-solitary-confine
ment-of-juveniles-in-federal-prisons.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2017) (“President
Obama . . . banned the practice of holding juveniles in solitary confinement in
federal prisons, saying it could lead to ‘devastating, lasting psychological
consequences.’”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
29. See infra Part II.A (exploring the harms stemming from
overcriminalization: “too much criminal law and punishment; excessive and
uneven discretion; and the erosion of the criminal law’s legitimacy”).
30. See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357–58 (1983) (“[T]he more
important aspect of the vagueness doctrine ‘is . . . the requirement that a
legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement.’” (quoting
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to center on unclear statutory language.31 Perhaps because of this
narrow construction, the doctrine is largely absent in current
scholarship on overcriminalization. Stuntz even praised vaguely
worded laws because they permit “judges and juries to exercise
judgment when applying those boundaries to individual cases.”32
This praise misses the mark. On the contrary, I argue that
vagueness may offer the quasi-constitutional limitation on the
substantive criminal law that Stuntz so desperately sought.33
To support this claim, I return to the doctrine’s robust use in
the past to void vagrancy and loitering statutes, and build on
scholarship stemming from those cases.34 The scope and
malleability of vagueness doctrine arguably renders it a
substantive rather than procedural review—what Anthony
Amsterdam described as a “means to an end”35 and John Calvin
Jeffries termed a judicial “makeweight” to prohibit normatively
problematic criminalization.36 Demonstrating this use, legal
historian Risa Goluboff has mapped how liberty and equality
concerns animated the Supreme Court’s voiding of vagrancy laws

Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S., 566, 574 (1974))).
31. See, e.g., United States v. JDT, 762 F.3d 984, 997 (9th Cir. 2014)
(“Cases assessing whether a statute allows arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement consider unguided enforcement based on vagueness in the text of
the statute.”); Lawrence M. Solan, Law, Language, and Lenity, 40 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 57, 58 (1998) (“The traditional rule for construing criminal statutes
is . . . that penal statutes should be strictly construed against the government or
parties seeking to enforce statutory penalties . . . .”).
32. WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 303
(2011) [hereinafter STUNTZ, COLLAPSE].
33. See infra Part II.B.1 (suggesting that striking laws for vagueness could
rein in statutory schemes that are overly permissive of prosecutors’ and judges’
uses of discretion).
34. These cases and scholarship date from the 1960s–1990s. See infra notes
386–388 and accompanying text (describing various circumstances in which the
courts have used void-for-vagueness doctrine to strike down laws).
35. See generally Anthony Amsterdam, Note, The Void-for-Vagueness
Doctrine in the Supreme Court: A Means to an End, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67 (1960)
[hereinafter Amsterdam, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine] (recognizing the
procedural due process elements of vagueness review, but likening it more to
substantive due process analysis).
36. See John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction
of Penal Statutes, 71 VA. L. REV. 189, 198 (1985) (using this term to refer to the
related judicial tool of strict statutory construction).
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in the earliest vagueness cases.37 Although only hints of these
substantive due process concerns remain explicit in the final
opinions, scholars have persuasively argued that these cases may
be read as a prohibition on the use of the criminal law to impose
mainstream morals on marginalized citizens.38
Recent decisions bolster this reading of vagueness,
supporting my argument that the doctrine can be repurposed to
address contemporary overcriminalization.39 Indeed, Justice
Thomas recognized this potential in his recent concurrence in
Johnson v. United States.40 There, Justice Thomas asserted that
the doctrine’s “uncomfortably similar history with substantive
due process” so troubled him that he explores jettisoning
vagueness altogether.41 Commentators have also noted that
Johnson “broadens” the doctrine, facilitating successful
challenges and signaling the Court’s concern with our flawed
criminal justice system.42 Another recent decision, Skilling v.
37. Goluboff has demonstrated through archival research that prior
versions of Justice Douglas’ draft opinion in Papachristou included Ninth
Amendment and substantive due process analysis. See Risa L. Goluboff,
Dispatch from the Supreme Court Archives: Vagrancy, Abortion, and What the
Links Between Them Reveal About the History of Fundamental Rights, 62 STAN.
L. REV. 1361, 1365–70 (2010) [hereinafter Goluboff, Dispatch] (asserting that
“draft opinions in the Justices’ papers did not in fact rely on vagueness alone”).
38. See Amsterdam, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine, supra note 35, at 115
(arguing that the cases constitute limitations on legitimate uses of state
coercion); Post, Reconceptualizing Vagueness, supra note 13, at 498 (asserting
that Papachristou stands for the proposition that “the norms of middle-class
virtue are not a constitutionally acceptable basis for ordering the relationship
between police and citizens). Like peer statutory rape, Papachristou entailed the
enforcement of mainstream gender and sexuality norms; the defendants
included two interracial couples whose relationships were unpalatable in 1960s
Florida. See id. at 496–99 (discussing Papachristou).
39. See Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2557–58 (2015) (using
the vagueness doctrine to strike portions of the Armed Career Criminal Act of
1984); Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 412 (2010) (upholding a statute
defining “a scheme or artifice to defraud” because it was not so vague as to
include a multitude of uncertain misconduct).
40. 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015).
41. See id. at 2564 (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that, while he has
joined the Court in decisions involving the “modern vagueness doctrine” before,
the “origins and application” of the doctrine have become troubling).
42. See Carissa Byrne Hessick, Johnson v. United States and the Future of
the Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine, 10 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 152, 159 (2015)
(“[T]he case may make it easier for criminal defendants to prevail on vagueness
challenges in future cases . . . .”); Armed Career Criminal Act—Residual
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United States,43 also focuses on the immense net of the criminal
statute at issue, hinting at the doctrine’s use for limiting state
coercion of widespread behavior.44 Finally, three state supreme
courts recently used vagueness reasoning to prohibit peer
statutory rape prosecutions where both children were under the
age of consent.45 These decisions reinforce the promise vagueness
holds for substantive criminal law reform—to limit who can be
prosecuted and on what grounds they can be selected and
punished.
Similar to the historic vagrancy and loitering laws, peer
statutory rape law imposes mainstream morals on a small group
of offenders selected for illegitimate reasons. Given this punitive
and unjust use of state power, I make the novel argument to
decriminalize all consensual peer sex, peers being those below the
age of sixteen-years-old. Other scholars considering statutory
rape have suggested thoughtful reforms, but all support the
ongoing criminalization of these consensual peer interactions in
some form.46 In contrast, I contend that no modifications can
Clause—Johnson v. United States, 129 HARV. L. REV. 301, 310 (2015)
[hereinafter Armed Career Criminal Act] (“Justice Scalia’s opinion demonstrates
the great lengths to which the Court is prepared to go when a poorly drafted
statute imperils defendants’ liberty and due process rights.”).
43. 561 U.S. 358 (2010).
44. See infra Part II.B.2 and accompanying text (discussing the impact of
laws regulating common behavior and the often absurd enforcement results).
45. See In re D.B., 950 N.E.2d 528, 533 (Ohio 2011) (“As applied to children
under the age of 13 who engage in sexual conduct with other children under the
age of 13 . . . [the law] is unconstitutionally vague . . . .”); In re Z.C., 165 P.3d
1206, 1207–08 (Utah 2007) (determining that a plain language reading of a
Utah statute that led to the prosecution of a thirteen-year-old girl for sex with a
twelve-year-old boy, and vice versa, led to absurd results); In re G.T., 758 A.2d
301, 308 (Vt. 2000) (arguing that a plain language reading of a Vermont statute
that led to the prosecution of a fourteen-year-old boy for sex with twelve-yearold girl led to absurd results). The court in D.B. voided the statute as vague. The
other two courts based their holdings on the statute’s “absurdity” to avoid
reaching the constitutional issues, but their main concern was an overly broad
statute and selective enforcement.
46. See, e.g., Kay Levine, The Intimacy Discount: Prosecutorial Discretion,
Privacy, and Equality in the Statutory Rape Caseload, 55 EMORY L.J. 691, 712
n.82 (2006) [hereinafter Levine, Intimacy] (reviewing historical reforms in
statutory rape law); Michele Goodwin, Law’s Limits: Regulating Statutory Rape
Law, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 481, 533–40 (2013) [hereinafter Goodwin, Law’s Limits]
(suggesting that funds be reallocated and juvenile perpetrators of consensual
statutory rape be diverted around the criminal justice system); Michelle
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rectify the problems because overcriminalization and selective
enforcement are built into the law. Like other vaguenet crimes,
adolescent sexual activity is very prevalent, and of limited harm,
but still widely frowned upon.47 While twenty to thirty percent of
fourteen to sixteen-year-olds have had intercourse, sixty-six
percent of adults believe that sex at this age is “always wrong.”48
This public morality runs counter to medical expertise that peer
sexual exploration is developmentally normal, even at young
ages.49 Indeed, the strong views by adults against adolescent
sexuality likely reflect what one expert has described as a class,
gender, and race-based “[a]dult [d]isgust[] and . . . [d]emand for
[i]nnocence.”50 Just as the use of vagrancy by “the establishment
to keep the untouchables in line”51 was impermissible, so is the

Oberman, Turning Girls into Women: Re-Evaluating Modern Statutory Rape
Law, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 15, 71 (1994) [hereinafter Oberman, Turning
Girls into Women] (proposing that institutions impose stricter standards on
what constitutes “consent”). I address their analyses further infra Part III.A.
47. See TOM W. SMITH & JAESOK SON, NORC, TRENDS IN PUBLIC ATTITUDES
SEXUAL
MORALITY,
GENERAL
SOCIAL
SURVEY
2
(2013),
ABOUT
http://www.norc.org/PDFs/GSS%20Reports/Trends%20in%20Sexual%20Morailit
y_Final.pdf (examining teen sexual behavior and public attitudes regarding that
behavior).
48. Id.
49. For instance, the “Bible of psychiatry,” the DSM-5, prohibits a
diagnosis of pedophilia in those below age sixteen and bans diagnosing even
older teenagers unless the victim is at least five years younger. Even then it
cautions against a pedophilia diagnosis. See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC
& STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 697 (5th ed. 2015) (enumerating
diagnostic criterion that include the “individual is at least age 16 years and at
least 5 years older than the child”).
50. R. DANIELLE EGAN, BECOMING SEXUAL: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF THE
SEXUALIZATION OF GIRLS 107 (2013). In prior work, I have argued that the
regulation of sexuality plays an overly intrusive role in various areas of law.
See, e.g., Cynthia Godsoe, Perfect Plaintiffs, 125 YALE L.J.F. 136, 147–48 (2015),
[hereinafter Godsoe, Perfect Plaintiffs] (arguing that desexing gay couples was
necessary to render same-sex palatable to the mainstream); Cynthia Godsoe,
Punishment as Protection, 52 HOUS. L. REV. 1313, 1317–18 (2015) [hereinafter
Godsoe, Punishment as Protection] (critiquing the punishment of prostituted
minors in the name of protection).
51. GOLUBOFF, VAGRANT NATION, supra note 14, at 135 (quoting Anthony G.
Amsterdam, Federal Constitutional Restrictions on the Punishment of Crimes of
Status, Crimes of General Obnoxiousness, Crimes of Displeasing Police Officers,
and the Like, 3 CRIM. L. BULL. 207, 233 n.4 (1967)).
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use of peer statutory rape by prosecutors and parents to police
minors’ sexual conduct that displeases them.52
Two caveats are necessary. First, my argument is not that
peer adolescent sexual activity is never harmful; it may be where,
for instance, there is a very large age difference. The costs of
criminalization, however, outweigh the benefits.53 Second, I do
not claim that courts should or will void every peer statutory rape
law for vagueness; procedural limitations and the contested scope
of the doctrine make that impossible.54 Instead, my more limited
point is that the rule of law and fairness principles underlying
vagueness can offer a blueprint for much needed reform.55
This Article unfolds as follows. Part II delineates the
overcriminalization endemic to the juvenile justice system.56
After discussing statutory rape’s long use, Part II details several
successful recent challenges in peer cases, outlining the courts’
concerns with overly broad statues and selective enforcement.57
Part III uses peer statutory rape to illustrate the harms of
vaguenets.58 It argues that the law is used to selectively police
the widespread harmless conduct of adolescent sexuality,
concomitantly enforcing gender roles and punishing same-sex
conduct.59 It next maps the vagueness doctrine and contends that
it has great potential, in letter or in spirit, to address equality
and liberty concerns underlying overcriminalization.60
52. Parents are the primary parties who initiate proceedings. Infra notes
172–174 and accompanying text.
53. Other state interventions, such as a public health approach, could help
empower parents to address their children’s sexual activity. See Goodwin, Law’s
Limits, supra note 46, at 490–91 (comparing the benefits of statutory rape laws
with the high cost of aggressive enforcement).
54. Nor do I claim that vagueness constitutes a full or clear constitutional
limitation on the substantive criminal law. Instead, I argue that it allows courts
to address these concerns and, as Jeffries pointed out, may provide good “cover”
for this analysis. See Jeffries, supra note 36, at 218 (describing the vagueness
doctrine as a tool to curb arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of the law).
55. Accordingly, while I make the argument that peer statutory rape
should be abolished, I do not specify whether that should happen via
legislatures or courts. There are benefits and drawbacks to both.
56. Infra Part II.
57. Id.
58. Infra Part III.
59. Id.
60. Id.

186

74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 173 (2017)

Part IV argues for the full decriminalization of peer statutory
rape.61 In so doing, it posits a new category of offender-less
harms—societal problems for which no one should be punished.62
I conclude by gesturing toward questions this analysis might
raise for one of the law’s most deeply entrenched legal
classifications, that of victim and offender.63
II. Regulating Adolescent Sexuality in the World of
Overcriminalization
This Part argues that the immense discretion and
paternalistic mandate of juvenile court has led to a “perfect
storm” of overcriminalization. Indeed, minors are sometimes
subject to more punitive control than adults.64 It begins by briefly
sketching out the conversation on overcriminalization, a
conversation that has largely overlooked juveniles. After
demonstrating the excessive punishment of juveniles, it argues
that their diminished culpability and increased vulnerability
make them a particularly important part of reform efforts.
Statutory rape serves as a lens into children’s dual status as
victims and offenders, a status highly dependent on gender and
race.65 The crime of statutory rape was developed at the same
time as the juvenile court, both tasked with protecting children’s
sexuality from adult exploiters—particularly white, female, and
middle class children.66 In the 1980s and 1990s (unfounded) fears
61. Infra Part IV.
62. Id.
63. Infra Part V.
64. For instance, juveniles can be punished for non-criminal status offenses
and are sometimes subject to indeterminate sentences or longer sentences than
adults. See generally BARRY C. FELD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON JUVENILE JUSTICE
ADMINISTRATION 71–72, 710–28, 858–62 (2000) [hereinafter FELD, JUVENILE
JUSTICE].
65. See Julian D. Ford, Psychosocial Interventions for Traumatized Youth
in the Juvenile Justice System: Research, Evidence Base, and Clinical/Legal
Challenges, 5 J. JUV. JUST. 31, 39 (2016), http://youthlaw.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/04/Ford-et-al-Psychosocial-Interventions-for-TraumatizedYouth.pdf (stating that the term “dual status” often refers to “youth who become
involved in both the child welfare and juvenile justice systems”).
66. See COCCA, JAILBAIT, supra note 19, at 16 (describing how the juvenile
court was established and issues the court faced).
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about a coming generation of youth “superpredators” contributed
to the rise of the carceral state.67 At the same time, the (also
unfounded) panic about child sex abuse by strangers resulted in
extremely harsh sex offender penalties.68 This Part ends with a
close examination of three recent prosecutions of minors for peer
consensual sex. These cases illustrate the other side of statutory
rape—its use not as a “shield” to protect minors but as a “sword”
against them.
A. The Over-Criminalization Epidemic
Overcriminalization is undoubtedly the most pressing
criminal justice problem of our era.69 It is defined in a number of
ways; here I use the broadest definition to include both the
volume of criminal laws as well as the range of prohibited
conduct.70 These combine to create an impermissible level of state
coercion. Scholars have identified three main types of harms
stemming from overcriminalization—too much criminal law and
67. See Kristin Henning, Criminalizing Normal Adolescent Behavior in
Communities of Color: The Role of Prosecutors in Juvenile Justice Reform, 98
CORNELL L. REV. 383, 408 (2013) (documenting the 1980s narrative that the
crime problem was a “black youth” problem); see also Sara Sun Beale, You’ve
Come a Long Way Baby: Two Waves of Juvenile Justice Reforms as Seen from
Jena, Louisiana, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 511, 525 (2009) [hereinafter Beale,
You’ve Come a Long Way] (stating that the media perpetuated the notion of
“superpredators”).
68. See, e.g., PHILIP JENKINS, MORAL PANIC: CHANGING CONCEPTS OF THE
CHILD MOLESTER IN MODERN AMERICA 1 (1998) (describing the “creation of social
facts” including “the belief that children face a grave danger in the form of
sexual abuse and molestation”). The surprisingly scant scholarly and policy
attention given to peer statutory rape also reflects this gap between public
perceptions of adolescent and child sexual activity, and the reality.
69. See Overcriminalization: An Explosion of Federal Criminal Law,
HERITAGE FOUND. (Apr. 27, 2011), http://origin.heritage.org/research/factsheets/
2011/04/overcriminalization-an-explosion-of-federal-criminal-law (last visited
Mar. 2, 2017) (detailing statistics on the exponential increase in criminal laws)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
70. See John Gardner, Doug Husak, Overcriminalization: The Limits of the
Criminal Law, NOTRE DAME PHIL. REVS. (Aug. 3, 2008) (book review),
http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/23674-overcriminalization-the-limits-of-the-criminallaw/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2017) (setting forth this definition and noting that
“[t]he rule of law is threatened no less by the sweepingness of criminal laws
than by their proliferation”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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punishment; excessive and uneven discretion; and the erosion of
the criminal law’s legitimacy.71
The harms of too harsh a level of punishment are self-evident,
so instead I chart here the harm of too much criminal law—
particularly the criminalization of harmless or morals offenses.
Erik Luna has described overcriminalization as “a broad
phenomenon . . . always involving the unjustifiable use of the
criminal justice system.”72 Of particular concern is the
punishment of harmless or blameless conduct. Doug Husak
persuasively argues for two constraints on criminalization: the
non-trivial harm and the wrongfulness constraints.73 Relatedly,
criminal laws must serve substantial state interests and be based
on empirical data.74 Under this rubric, Husak concludes that
most drug offenses do not merit criminalization.75
The sanctioning of “morals” offenses, such as consensual
sexual activity, is a particularly troublesome symptom of
criminalization. Sanford Kadish presciently opposed such a use of
the criminal law long before Lawrence v. Texas76 largely
eliminated it, arguing that the criminalization of widespread,
harmless behavior risks selective enforcement and erodes the
law’s legitimacy.77 More recently, Sara Sun Beale has
documented the ongoing use of such crimes as fornication and
adultery either to impose mainstream morality on certain people,
or as a pretext for more serious and harder to prove offenses such
71. See generally Todd Haugh, Overcriminalization’s New Harm Paradigm,
68 VAND. L. REV. 1191 (2015). There is also the opportunity cost of money and
time that could have been spent on other programs to address social problems.
See generally id.
72. Erik Luna, The Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 AM. U. L. REV.
703, 718 (2005).
73. See HUSAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION, supra note 11, at 65 (arguing that
these constraints “limit the reach of criminal sanction”).
74. See id. at 153 (“[I]t is eminently sensible to demand more than a mere
rational basis for believing that the law might produce its intended benefits.”).
75. See id. at 166–70 (referring to various scholars who argue that
criminalization does more harm than good).
76. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
77. See Sanford H. Kadish, Legal Norm and Discretion in the Police and
Sentencing Processes, 75 HARV. L. REV. 904, 908 (1961) (arguing that selective
enforcement is not necessarily “a legitimate and necessary means of making the
law act soundly and in accordance with common sense”).
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as non-consensual rape.78 Pretextual prosecutions, even of
persons who are guilty of other unprovable offenses, bring
significant harms.79 Morals have also influenced the
regulation of more serious sex offenses, resulting in what one
commentator
aptly
describes
as
“[t]he
profoundly
80
dysfunctional criminal regulation of sexual harm.”
Turning to the second over-criminalization harm, the
broad net of excessive criminal law gives incredible discretion
to police and prosecutors. This discretion leads to arbitrary,
even discriminatory, enforcement. 81 As one leading scholar
describes it, overcriminalization leads to “excessive unchecked
discretion in enforcement authorities, . . . inevitable disparity
among similarly situated persons [because of inevitable
under-enforcement, and] potential for abuse by enforcement
authorities.”82 Prosecutorial discretion is particularly
powerful; the wide net of criminal laws gives them incredible
charging leverage.83 This, combined with overly harsh
potential sanctions, means that almost all of those selected
for arrest and prosecution will end up pleading guilty to
something. 84 The modern plea bargaining system compounds
this by rendering charging decisions—and any impermissible
discretion used to decide them—largely invisible.85 Indeed,
78. See Beale, Overcriminalization, supra note 20, at 759, 765 (stating that
such use “may invite prosecutorial conduct that is at best arbitrary and at worst
discriminatory”).
79. See generally Harry Litman, Pretextual Prosecution, 92 GEO. L.J. 1135
(2004) (outlining harms including prosecution on illegitimate grounds, inequity,
and a lack of procedural justice).
80. Allegra M. McLeod, Regulating Sexual Harm: Strangers, Intimates, and
Social Institutional Reform, 102 CAL. L. REV. 1553, 1621 (2014).
81. See Beale, Overcriminalization, supra note 20, at 758 (arguing that
vague and overbroad statutes lead to such discretion).
82. Id. at 749. As I outline further below, excessive discretion and selective
enforcement are also central concerns underlying the harms the vagueness
doctrine strives to address.
83. See Kadish, supra note 77, at 905 (arguing that such discretion is “de
facto if not de jure”).
84. See id. at 905 n.2 (stating that this may result from the judge’s
discretion to accept a plea deal for a lesser offense).
85. See Jocelyn Simonson, The Criminal Court Audience in a Post-Trial
World, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2173, 2180 (2014) (describing the modern plea bargain
system as being controlled by “elite actors” who make “behind-the-scenes
decisions”). The juvenile justice system, with its closed courts and lack of juries,
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Stuntz aptly characterized prosecutors as today’s “real
lawmakers.”86
Third, excessive and unfair punishment warps the criminal
law’s expressive value and erodes its legitimacy.87 It is
undisputed that the criminal law plays an important expressive
role in designating societal norms.88 The inconsistent,
particularly
selective,
enforcement
endemic
to
overcriminalization sends inconsistent messages—is marijuana
possession actually to be condemned? Or is it only wrong if you
are one of the very small fraction of those violators who are
prosecuted, chosen largely based on your neighborhood or race?89
Compounding this dynamic, the law’s loss of legitimacy itself has
a crimogenic effect.90
Despite this cogent outline of harms, the over-criminalization
dialogue still has gaps. It has largely focused on federal criminal
law.91 Although commentators have begun to explore
overcriminalization in the states, the widespread and harsh
punishment of juveniles has not been explicitly connected to the
has always been even more invisible. See infra Part III.A.2 (describing
prosecutorial discretion in the context of gender and sexuality).
86. See Stuntz, Pathological Politics, supra note 20, at 506 (noting that the
definition of crimes and their defenses empower prosecutors).
87. See id. at 520 (noting this “may be the most important” consequence of
overcriminalization); see also HUSAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION, supra note 11, at 31
(stating that the overcriminalization’s combination of “unchecked discretion
coupled with all-encompassing offenses is destructive of the rule of law”).
88. See Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L.
REV. 413, 420 (1999) (arguing that “we can’t identify criminal wrongdoing and
punishment independently of their social meanings”).
89. As Doug Husak has shown, these prosecutions are highly racially and
geographically variable. See HUSAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION, supra note 11, at 29–
32 (describing the significant role that race and geography play in marijuana
possession prosecutions).
90. See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 106 (2006) (noting that
the law’s legitimacy “can be eroded by unsatisfactory experiences with police
officers or judges”).
91. See generally Beale, Overcriminalization, supra note 20; Haugh, supra
note 71. See also James R. Copland & Isaac Gorodetski, Manhattan Moment:
Overcriminalization Is Also a Problem in the States, WASH. EXAMINER, (Oct. 31,
2014), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/manhattan-moment-overcriminalizationis-also-a-problem-in-the-states/article/2555492 (last visited Mar. 2, 2017)
(stating that little effort has been made to quantify the reach of criminal law at
the state level) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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broader over-criminalization phenomenon.92 I argue below that
the origins and structure of juvenile court have created a
particularly robust form of overcriminalization, whose harms are
magnified by the diminished culpability and increased
vulnerability of minors. As such, juveniles merit inclusion in the
larger dialogue. Moreover, these same characteristics render
minors an appealing group for reform, who could function as a
wedge for broader decriminalization efforts.
B. Overcriminalization of Juveniles
1. Deep “Parental” Discretion
The juvenile court was deliberately structured to have an
immense sweep and vast discretion—laying the groundwork for
overcriminalization and concomitant selective enforcement.93
Discretion was and remains deliberately paternalistic.94 Because
the (male) judge was like a father, acting in a child’s best
interests, the due process protections of the criminal justice
system were deemed unnecessary.95 As one early observer of the
court opined: “Why is it not just and proper to treat these juvenile
offenders . . . as a wise and merciful father handles his own child
whose errors are not discovered by the authorities?”96
Prosecutorial discretion likely outweighs even judicial
discretion, and this discretion is heightened in the closed and
92. See, e.g., Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanor Decriminalization, 68
VAND. L. REV. 1055, 1057 (2015) (exploring decriminalization as a form of relief
for overcriminalization). Numerous scholars have aptly critiqued the juvenile
justice system, critiques I build on here, but they have not been in conversation
with overcriminalization scholars.
93. ANTHONY M. PLATT, THE CHILD SAVERS: THE INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY
139 (expanded 40th anniversary ed. 2009); see also MICHAEL WILLRICH, CITY OF
COURTS: SOCIALIZING JUSTICE IN PROGRESSIVE ERA CHICAGO xxviii (2003)
(juvenile court “aimed not merely to punish offenders but to assist and discipline
entire urban populations”).
94. See Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 110
(1909) (stating that a state acts for “the welfare of its children”).
95. See id. (“[T]he legislature surely may provide for the salvation of such a
child, if its parents or guardian be unable or unwilling to do so, by bringing it
into one of the courts of the state . . . .”).
96. Id. at 107.
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rarely scrutinized juvenile context.97 As one scholar describes it,
“prosecutors operate in virtual secrecy with unreviewable
charging authority, especially in juvenile courts where court
records and proceedings are confidential.”98 Virtually no
guidelines exist, including for significant decisions such as
whether to try a minor as an adult.99 Both historically and
recently, discretion often operates as a one-way ratchet for
punitive interventions.100
The one significant check on prosecutorial discretion—
juries—is missing from the juvenile system.101 Sara Sun Beale
97. See, e.g., Beale, You’ve Come a Long Way, supra note 67, at 515–16
(arguing that while the Warren Court adopted race-neutral procedural
mechanisms, it did not impose any restrictions on prosecutorial discretion).
98. Henning, supra note 67, at 350; see also Angela J. Davis, Prosecution
and Race: The Power, and Privilege of Discretion, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 13, 14 n.7
(1998).
99. See OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, TRYING
JUVENILES AS ADULTS: AN ANALYSIS OF STATE TRANSFER LAWS AND REPORTING 5
(Sept. 2011), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/232434.pdf (reporting that
“prosecutorial [transfer] laws are usually silent regarding standards, protocols,
or appropriate considerations for decision-making” and conceding the lack of
process renders it “possible that prosecutorial discretion laws in some places
operate like statutory exclusions, sweeping whole categories into criminal court
with little or no individualized consideration.”).
100. Historically, discretion was rarely used to release children, instead
leading to long or indeterminate sentences in reformatories that were far more
punitive than rehabilitative. See MEDA CHESNEY-LIND & RANDALL G. SHELDEN,
GIRLS, DELINQUENCY AND JUVENILE JUSTICE 127 (4th ed. 1992) (noting that “the
laws ‘transformed routine discretion into formal policy’”) citing JOHN R. SUTTON,
STUBBORN CHILDREN: CONTROLLING DELINQUENCY IN THE UNITED STATES, 16401981, 94 (1993). The Supreme Court acknowledged the punitive reality of the
juvenile justice system sixty years later in In re Gault. See 387 U.S. 1, 14–16
(1967) (“In practically all jurisdictions, there are rights granted to adults which
are withheld from juveniles.”). Gerald Gault was sentenced to just under six
years in an institution for making prank phone calls. See id. at 29 (stating that
if Gerald had been over eighteen, “the maximum punishment would have been a
fine of $5 to $50, or imprisonment in jail for not more than two months.”).
Today, the punitive trend continues with tens of thousands of juveniles being
tried as adults every year. See OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY
PREVENTION, supra note 99, at 13 (noting that in 2005, approximately 23,000
juvenile cases prosecuted in adult criminal court).
101. In Schall v. Martin, the Supreme Court denied juveniles the right to a
jury trial. See 467 U.S. 253, 263 (1984) (noting that the Constitution does not
require the elimination of all difference in treatments of juveniles). Today, only
ten states grant juveniles that right. See Juvenile Right to Jury Chart, NAT’L
JUVENILE
DEF.
CTR.
(July
17,
2014),
http://njdc.info/wpcontent/uploads/2014/01/Right-to-Jury-Trial-Chart-7-18-14-Final.pdf (listing the
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argues that the lack of a right to jury trial, and relatedly to a jury
trial free of race-based peremptory challenges, has resulted in
even greater prosecutorial discretion over minors than in the
adult criminal system.102 Using the recent Louisiana Jena 6 case
as a case study, Beale demonstrates how the lack of checks on
prosecutorial discretion and disparate treatment resulted in
vastly different charging of White and Black youths for schoolrelated fighting.103 Only large-scale protests and media attention
to the case led the prosecutors to change their strategy.104
Such scrutiny of the punishment of juveniles is unfortunately
very rare. Stephanos Bibas and others have pointed out the
important role that criminal trials played historically as
“educational social theater,” and lamented the lack of public
insight into the criminal justice system in today’s plea bargaining
world.105 The juvenile justice system, which in most jurisdictions
does not have juries and/or is closed to the public, has always
been opaque and largely unknown to the general public.106 This
arguably has resulted in even more misguided and selectively
enforced policies in this realm.107
2. Broad Disciplinary Scope
The scope of punitive interventions for juveniles also
parallels that of adults.108 From the start, “[b]road and vague
states which grant this right and detailing the circumstances in which the right
is awarded).
102. See Beale, You’ve Come a Long Way, supra note 67, at 528–33
(describing cases where racial overtones lead to prosecutorial discretion).
103. See id. at 514 (describing, inter alia, “particularly the adequacy of the
remedies to challenge prosecutorial discretion and disparate treatment by the
prosecution”).
104. See id. at n.4 (listing various media sources describing protests and the
changing narrative).
105. See STEPHANOS BIBAS, THE MACHINERY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE xv (2012)
(“When values conflict, trials help to air and reconcile them.”).
106. See B. Finberg, Right to Jury Trial in Juvenile Court Delinquency
Proceedings, 100 A.L.R.2d 1241 § 2[a] (1965) (delineating states in which this
right was denied).
107. See BIBAS, supra note 105, at 69–72, 109–14 (advocating that “criminal
procedures . . . should have rich moral and political goals”).
108. Juveniles, like adults, are subject to incarceration and probation,

194

74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 173 (2017)

definitions of delinquency were favored” to bring more youth
under the court’s jurisdiction.109 The ongoing robust use of status
offenses—non-criminal acts such as truancy, running away, and
disobedience to parents—demonstrates that this jurisdiction
remains robust.110 Paternalism justifies harsh state interventions
including “extraordinary power” to incarcerate minors.111
Although most criminal law theorists criticize paternalistic
justifications for criminal sanctions, they continue to be routinely
used in the punishment of juveniles.112 To relate just one
example, minors who are too young to consent and who are
designated victims under trafficking laws continue to be
prosecuted and incarcerated under prostitution laws, often
justified as for their own protection.113 Paternalism greatly
expands the breadth of state intervention by obscuring the harms
of punishment and justifying virtually any act for a young
person’s “own good.”
This paternalistic scope was coupled with increasingly harsh
sanctions during the 1980s and 1990s, leading one commentator
to term the system “the worst of both worlds.”114 The
criminalization and incarceration epidemic had both roots in and
sometimes for longer periods than in the criminal system. See FELD, JUVENILE
JUSTICE, supra note 64, at 69–71 (quoting Martin R. Gardner, who argues that
detention is sometimes categorized as “treatment” or “involuntary therapy”).
109. Franklin E. Zimring, The Common Thread: Diversion in the
Jurisprudence of a Century of Juvenile Justice, in A CENTURY OF JUVENILE
JUSTICE 142 (2000).
110. See Cynthia Godsoe, Contempt, Status and the Criminalization of
Non-Conforming Girls, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 1091, 1098 (2014) [hereinafter
Godsoe, Contempt] (discussing status offender jurisdiction and reporting 2009
data of “316,300 arrests of minors for just three categories of status offenses—
running away, curfew violations, and liquor law violations”).
111. Guggenheim, supra note 21, at 470.
112. See generally HUSAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION, supra note 11, at 88
(analyzing and challenging the theories of Herbert Morris and Jean Hampton on
the paternalistic justifications of criminal punishment).
113. See Godsoe, Punishment as Protection, supra note 50, at 1314
(critiquing this practice and describing it as “dysfunctional”).
114. BARRY C. FELD, BAD KIDS: RACE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
JUVENILE COURT 110 (1999) [hereinafter FELD, BAD KIDS]. This situation has led
Feld and others to call for the abolition of the juvenile court. See generally Barry
C. Feld, Abolish the Juvenile Court: Youthfulness, Criminal Responsibility, and
Sentencing Policy, 88 J. CRIM L. & CRIMINOLOGY 68 (1997) [hereinafter Feld,
Abolish the Juvenile Court].
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effects on juveniles.115 The crackdown on crime arose in part
based on fears of a coming generation of “superpredators,”116 fears
that were empirically unsound but remarkably resonant with the
public.117 A few highly publicized cases of juvenile violent crime,
coupled with media and political rhetoric about remorseless “little
monsters,” led every state to overhaul its juvenile system,
facilitating the prosecution of minors as adults and mandating
harsher penalties.118
3. Racial and Gendered Control
Scholars have developed a robust literature in recent years
describing the use of criminal sanctions, or the threat thereof, to
control poor and marginalized communities.119 This mission is
heightened in the case of youth—future citizens deemed more
malleable than adults. Indeed, the juvenile court was created in
large part to regulate and “Americanize” low-income immigrant
youth.120 Befitting these origins, the juvenile justice system has
always been disproportionately composed of race, class, and
gender minorities.121 As Barry Feld put it: “[T]he juvenile court
115. Like the broader criminal crackdown, the reforms aimed at increasing
punishment of juveniles were highly racialized. See, e.g., Barry C. Feld, Race,
Politics, and Juvenile Justice: The Warren Court and the Conservative
‘Backlash’, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1447, 1459 (2003) (“Progressive reformers intended
the juvenile court to discriminate.”).
116. Beale, You’ve Come a Long Way, supra note 67, at 514.
117. See FELD, BAD KIDS, supra note 114, at 189–208 (noting that politicians
“demonized young people in order to muster support for policies”).
118. Beale, You’ve Come a Long Way, supra note 67, at 535; see also
Guggenheim, supra note 21, at 524 (describing the state court prosecution of
older minors as adults under the banner of police powers).
119. See generally DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND
SOCIAL ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY (2001); JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING
THROUGH CRIME (2007); LOIC WACQUANT, PUNISHING THE POOR (2004).
120. See PLATT, supra note 93, at 139 (“It was not by accident that the
behavior selected for penalizing . . . was primarily attributable to the children of
lower-class migrant and immigrant families.”); Barry C. Feld, The
Transformation of the Juvenile Court—Part II: Race and the “Crack Down” on
Youth Crime, 84 MINN. L. REV. 327, 339 (1999) [hereinafter Feld, The
Transformation of the Juvenile Court—Part II] (using a “coercive mechanism to
distinguish between ‘our children’ and ‘other people’s children’”).
121. See, e.g., Henning, supra note 67, at 383–409 (discussing the
intersection of race and class in the early juvenile court and its ongoing presence
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[was] deliberately designed . . . to discriminate against ‘other
people’s children’. . . .’”122 Racial disproportionality is present at
every stage of the process, from arrest to sentencing.123
Instilling middle-class gender and sexuality values was also
a key purpose of the original juvenile court.124 Girls were almost
always brought into the system for premarital sexual conduct or
parental defiance, as opposed to boys who were brought in for
actual criminal behavior, such as theft.125 The juvenile justice
system
remains
highly
gendered
today,
with
girls
disproportionately entering the system for “victimless” sex
offenses such as prostitution, and boys for same-sex conduct.126
The regulation of adolescent sexuality has long relied largely
on fear and sensationalism rather than empirical data.127 One
scholar aptly compares Foucault’s seminal critique of
anti-masturbation materials to current frenzies about sexual
predators of children.128 Foucault noted that the ironic effect of
in today’s system).
122. Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile Court—Part II, supra note
120, at 331.
123. See Beale, You’ve Come a Long Way, supra note 67, at 542 (noting
racial disproportionality was true “in all relevant offense types and all age
categories”).
124. See PLATT, supra note 93, at 3–4, 36–39 (stating that sexuality was one
of various key factors); Lisa Pasko, Damaged Daughters: The History of Girls’ Sexuality
and the Juvenile Justice System, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1099, 1100 (2010)
(describing one motivating factor as “prevent[ing] their straying from the path of sexual
purity”). Indeed, the juvenile court’s creation was driven in large part by a desire to regulate
the sexual activity of working class girls and young women. I have previously described
the long history of regulation of female sexuality via the criminal and status
offender laws. See generally Godsoe, Contempt, supra note 110; Godsoe,
Punishment as Protection, supra note 50.
125. Girls in the system were almost exclusively working-class, and often
racial and ethnic minorities. Steven Schlossman & Stephanie Wallach, The
Crime of Precocious Sexuality: Female Juvenile Delinquency in the Progressive
Era, 48 HARV. EDUC. REV. 65, 71 (1978).
126. See MARY E. ODEM, DELINQUENT DAUGHTERS: PROTECTING AND POLICING
ADOLESCENT FEMALE SEXUALITY IN THE UNITED STATES 1885–1920, 176–78 (1995)
(providing statistics for both boys and girls). This is consistent with my
argument that today minors, particularly males, are criminalized
disproportionally for same-sex sexual activity. Infra Part III.A.2.
127. See Pasko, supra note 124, at 1113 (stating that when
“girls . . . expressed their LBQ orientation, staff treated them with distrust, fear,
negative remarks, and occasional punishments”).
128. See Amy Adler, To Catch a Predator, 21 COL. J. GENDER & L. 130, 150
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moralistic and unscientific policies, such as a ban on
masturbation, was to sexualize children while also “din[ning] it
into parents’ heads that their children’s sex constituted a
fundamental problem.”129 This fear and disgust also influence the
punitive treatment of minors themselves, mostly boys, who are
designated sex offenders. In his seminal study of legal responses
to adolescent sexual offending, Frank Zimring reveals that
policies towards the treatment of minor sex offenders ignore
empirical and scientific evidence and depend largely on
stereotypes.130 I argue further below that these are primarily
gender and sexuality stereotypes.131
4. Lessened Culpability and Increased Harm
The overcriminalization of juveniles is particularly
concerning because they are both less culpable and more
vulnerable than adults.132 The Supreme Court’s recognition of
juveniles’ difference has been one of its only areas of criminal
justice reform in recent decades.133 Relying in part on
neuroscience, the Court recognized that adolescents are more
impulsive and less able to control their behavior based on
attenuated consequences: “the same characteristics that render
juveniles less culpable than adults suggest as well that juveniles
will be less susceptible to deterrence.”134 The Court reaffirmed
this principle as recently as October 2015, reiterating that
(2012) (noting that “predator’s sexual fantasies” have become part of the
mainstream media).
129. See id. at 150–51 (quoting Foucault and analyzing the spectacle around
narratives of predators and pedophiles).
130. See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, AN AMERICAN TRAVESTY: LEGAL RESPONSES TO
ADOLESCENT SEXUAL OFFENDING xiii (2004) [hereinafter ZIMRING, AMERICAN
TRAVESTY] (describing policy development as “less sympathetic to scientific
perspectives”).
131. Infra Part III.A.2.
132. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571 (2005) (drawing a comparison
between juveniles and mentally handicapped persons).
133. See id. (same).
134. Id. at 571; see also Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2465 (2012)
(“Because ‘the heart of the retribution rationale’ relates to an offender’s
blameworthiness, ‘the case for retribution is not as strong with a minor as an
adult.’” (citations omitted)).
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“children are constitutionally different from adults” for
punishment purposes and opining that “[minors] who commit
even heinous crimes are capable of change.”135 Marty
Guggenheim has persuasively argued that this line of cases
indicates that “[j]uveniles have a substantive right to be treated
differently when states seek to punish them.”136
Compounding the harm is minors’ vulnerability.137 By
definition, they are still developing, and as a result, they are at
greater risk than adults of harms from court involvement and
particularly incarceration, including sexual assault and
psychological trauma.138 This potential trauma has led numerous
states and, most recently, President Obama to ban solitary
confinement for minors.139 The stigma and separation from
families and schools are also particularly harmful for young
people.140 As with all overcriminalization, the harms extend
beyond the criminal realm.141 For instance, prosecution of
135. See Montgomery v. Louisiana, No. 14–280, slip op. at 15, 21 (U.S. 2016)
(quoting Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464) (mandating that states retroactively apply
the prohibition on mandatory life without parole sentences for juveniles).
136. Guggenheim, supra note 21, at 457. Recent state and local initiatives
also recognize the lower culpability of young offenders. One prominent example
is the New York State special pardon program for persons who committed a nonviolent offense at age 16 or 17. Governor Cuomo began the initiative to
“acknowledge that people can and do move beyond the mistakes of their
youth[,]” and avoid “giving a life sentence of stigmatization to kids[.]” In 2016,
over 100 people were pardoned under the program. Crack Down on Wage Theft,
N.Y. STATE (Jan. 8, 2017), https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-cuomooffers-executive-pardons-new-yorkers-convicted-crimes-ages-16-and-17
(last
visited Feb. 27, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
137. See Holning Lau, Pluralism: A Principle for Children’s Rights, 42 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 317, 333 (2007) (“Empirical evidence suggests that the
compounded harms are alarmingly real.”).
138. See OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION,
DETAINED YOUTH PROCESSED IN JUVENILE AND ADULT COURT: PSYCHIATRIC
DISORDERS
AND
MENTAL
HEALTH
NEEDS
8
(Sept.
2015),
http://www.ojjdp.gov/pubs/248283.pdf (reporting the high prevalence of mental
illness among youth in the system); BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SEXUAL
VICTIMIZATION IN JUVENILE FACILITIES REPORTED BY YOUTH 2008–2009, at 3 (Jan.
2010), http://www.bjs.gov/ content/pub/pdf/svjfry09.pdf (reporting sexual
victimization of youth).
139. See generally supra note 28 and accompanying text.
140. See Catherine L. Carpenter, Against Juvenile Sex Offender
Registration, 82 U. CIN. L. REV. 747, 770 (2014) [hereinafter Carpenter, Against
Juvenile] (noting that this can create a “long and punitive shadow”).
141. See Eisha Jain, Arrests as Regulation, 67 STAN. L. REV 809, 866 (2015)
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children for statutory rape chills young people from seeking
reproductive health care because it requires mandated child
abuse reporters to report even voluntary sexual activity between
minors.142
C. Child Victims
The same Progressive reformers who created the juvenile
court advocated for age-of-consent laws as part of their “purity”
campaign both for the good of young women and the good of the
nation.143 Statutory rape originally served to preserve girls’
chastity for marriage, conceived of as a property crime with a
girl’s father as the victim.144 This protection was class and race
specific.145 As Justice Brennan described it: “[B]ecause their
chastity was considered particularly precious, [white, middleclass] young women were felt to be uniquely in need of the State’s
protection.”146 Since then, statutory rape has been tasked with
preventing sexually transmitted infections,147 protecting society
against the costs of young motherhood,148 and facilitating
prosecutions of non-consensual or forcible rape.149
(showing that non-felony arrests and arrests that do not result in conviction
“magnify the effects of underlying and problematic police practices based on
racial profiling”).
142. See In re G.T., 758 A.2d 301, 304 (Vt. 2000) (attributing this to the lack
of confidentiality requirements).
143. See ODEM, supra note 126, at 171–82 (describing various cases in which
courts followed this agenda).
144. See Michelle Oberman, Girls in the Master’s House: Of Protection,
Patriarchy and the Potential for Using the Master’s Tools to Reconfigure
Statutory Rape Law, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 799, 802 (2000) [hereinafter Oberman,
Protection, Patriarchy] (“These gender-specific [statutory rape] laws reflected an
effort to protect a father’s interest in his daughter’s chastity.”).
145. See Note, Forcible and Statutory Rape: An Exploration of the Operation
and Objectives of the Consent Standard, 62 YALE L.J. 55, 76 (1952) (noting that
race influenced prosecutors approach to a case).
146. Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma Cty., 450 U.S. 464, 494–95
(1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
147. See People v. Gonzales, 561 N.Y.S.2d 358, 361 (Westchester Cty. Ct.
1990) (arguing that it is “proper” to take such infections into account).
148. See, e.g., State v. LaMere, 655 P.2d 46, 49–50 (Idaho 1982) (discussing
unwanted pregnancy).
149. See Levine, Intimacy, supra note 46, at 708–09 (discussing the
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The most common contemporary rationale for statutory rape
laws is the protection of minors from the harms of sex with
adults, particularly girls from sexual exploitation by older men.150
In her valuable empirical study of prosecutorial discretion in
adult-minor statutory rape cases, Kay Levine has documented
how some prosecutors choose which cases to pursue based on
their assessment of the relationship as a culpable “predator” and
non-culpable “peer.”151 This rationale, however, has not been
applied to protect all types of girls nor punish all adults.
Illustrating this is the widespread acceptance of certain older
man-teenaged girl couples; celebrities including David Bowie and
R. Kelly have had sex with minors and never faced prosecution.152
The law’s ambivalence about child-adult sexual activity is also
reflected in the fact that marriage continues to serve as a defense
to statutory rape in most jurisdictions.153 As Stephen Schulhofer,
a leading scholar of sex crimes, concludes, the term “statutory
California statutory rape law). This remains one of its main purposes today.
Infra Part III.A.2.
150. See, e.g., People v. Douglas, 886 N.E.2d 1232, 1243 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008)
(“[T]he State has a legitimate interest in protecting children of tender years
from sexual involvement and in putting on the adult the burden of determining
the age of the child.”); Commonwealth v. Albert, 758 A.2d 1149, 1153 (Pa. 2000)
(stating that a statutory rape statute “properly . . . [puts] the onus of sexual
responsibility . . . on the older more mature individual in the relationship”).
151. Levine, Intimacy, supra note 46, at 715–16.
152. See generally Vicky Bowles, David Bowie Sexual Assault Case Goes
Before Grand Jury, UPI (Nov. 11, 1987), http://www.upi.com/Archives/
1987/11/11/David-Bowie-sexual-assault-case-goes-before-grand-jury/8094563605
200/ (last visited Feb. 14, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review); Tyler Kingkade, Remember All the Gross Accusations Against R.
Kelly?, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 23, 2015, 2:32 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.
com/entry/r-kelly-sex-abuse-allegations_us_56797582e4b06fa6887eb270
(last
visited Feb. 14, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
Commentators continue to minimize and joke about the many celebrities who
commit statutory rape. See, e.g., Ruth Graham, The Jokes About Rob Lowe’s 16Year-Old Sex Partner at His Comedy Central Roast Were Kind of Gross, SLATE
(Sept.
6,
2016,
4:06
PM),
http://www.slate.com/blogs/xx_factor/
2016/09/06/the_jokes_about_rob_lowe_s_16_year_old_sex_partner_at_his_comed
y_central.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
153. But see Melissa Murray, Strange Bedfellows: Criminal Law, Family
Law, and the Legal Construction of Intimate Life, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1253, 1266
n.38 (2009) (noting that twenty-four states and the District of Columbia have
abolished the defense).
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rape” implies “that consensual sex [between a teenager and an
adult] is not really rape.”154
Statutory rape remains a strict liability crime in most
jurisdictions, and it brings severe penalties including, in many
states, sex offender registry.155 Children even younger than
fourteen have to comply with the same burdens as adult
offenders, despite markedly lower recidivism rates.156 The
particularly harsh consequences of sex offender registration
include intrusion into the private life of the offender, far-reaching
notification to communities, residency restrictions, and GPS
tracking.157
Originally, the age of consent was very low, usually ten years
old.158 The current upper age of consent varies from thirteen to
eighteen, but is sixteen years old in over half the states.159 Most
states also have a lower age of consent, ten to thirteen on
average, below which the offense is more severe.160 Thirty-two
states always criminalize sex with children younger than a
minimum age ranging from age nine to sixteen, regardless of the
age of the other party.161 The legislative history is largely silent
on peer statutory rape, but over the last twenty years a large
majority of states have added age gap or “Romeo and Juliet” laws
rendering the offense or punishment less severe for those close in
154. STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX: THE CULTURE OF INTIMIDATION
AND THE FAILURE OF LAW 102 (1998).
155. The federal Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA)
can require the automatic lifetime registration of juvenile offenders. See
Carpenter, Against Juvenile, supra note 140, at 751–52, 781–85 (listing various
offenses that can cause lifetime registration).
156. See id. at 750 (describing how a Minnesota trial court ordered lifetime
registration for an eleven-year-old child).
157. See id. at 781 (noting that the frequency of these consequences
increased over the last decade).
158. See COCCA, JAILBAIT, supra note 19, at 23–24 tbl.1.1 (2004) (referring to
statistics for the year 1885).
159. Infra Appendix A.
160. Id.
161. Id. The ALI is revising the highly influential Model Penal Code’s (MPC)
sex offense provisions, which have not been fully revised since 1962. The MPC
significantly improves the statutory rape provisions but does not, in my opinion,
go far enough. It still criminalizes sexual penetration with a minor under twelve
if the actor is more than two years older. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 213 (AM. LAW
INST., Discussion Draft No. 2, 2015).
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age.162 These provisions exonerate from liability, mitigate, or
serve as an affirmative defense to statutory rape when the two
parties are within a certain age range. 163 Although these
provisions significantly reduce peer liability, only five states
completely decriminalize consensual peer sex.164 Moreover,
several states do not include oral and anal sex in their age gap
exemptions.165
About half of high school students report that they have had
intercourse.166 More specifically, recent data shows that 16% of
students have had sex by age fifteen, the age of a typical ninth
grader, but by the time these students reach age eighteen, the
age of a typical twelfth grader, 61% will be sexually active.167 A
much smaller proportion—less than 2% but still constituting
millions of children—have had intercourse by the time they turn
twelve.168 An additional 8.1% of girls and 12.5% of boys age
fifteen to seventeen have had oral sex but not intercourse. 169

162. Id. Age gap laws generally decriminalize the conduct for a certain
swath of peers, while Romeo and Juliet laws make it an affirmative defense.
Here, I will refer to both types of statutes as age gap provisions.
163. Id. The age gap provisions of some states allow for mitigation of the
crime only, while other states’ provisions mitigate under certain circumstances
and decriminalize under others.
164. Id.
165. Infra notes 223–226; infra Appendix A.
166. See CDC, supra note 7, at 24, 113–14 (providing the prevalence of
sexual intercourse by both grade level and state).
167. See GUTTMACHER INST., supra note 7, at 1 (continuing to say that “on
average, young people have sex for the first time at about age 17”).
168. See id. (noting little difference between genders).
169. CASEY E. COPEN ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.
PREVALENCE AND TIMING OF ORAL SEX WITH OPPOSITE-SEX PARTNERS AMONG
FEMALES AND MALES AGED 15–24 YEARS: UNITED STATES, 2007–2010, 5 fig.2
(2012), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhsr/nhsr056.pdf.
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Figure 1170
Although statutory rape is no longer a crime against a girl’s
father, parents continue to play a very significant role.171 In
contrast to most crimes, law enforcement investigations virtually
never lead to prosecutions. Instead, most prosecutions are
triggered by parental reports.172 As a result, statutory rape laws
170. See supra notes 155–158 (providing the data used in this graph).
171. See COCCA, JAILBAIT, supra note 19, at 124 (explaining that without
parental intervention, the often consensual encounters would be more difficult
to prosecute).
172. See id. (observing also that teens often refuse to testify about
consensual activity); see also In re D.B., No. 2009 CA 00024, 2009 WL 5062017,
at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 22, 2009) (explaining that the victim’s father sought
counseling from the local children’s services, which then contacted the sheriff’s
department); In re G.T., 758 A.2d 301, 303 (Vt. 2000) (noting that the mother
came home to see the offender quickly get off of the victim). In In re G.T., the
prosecutor acknowledged that statutory rape cases usually arise from
complaints by parents. 758 A.2d at 306 (adding that prosecutors prefer the
easy-to-prove strict liability crime of statutory rape to other sex offense
charges). On the flip side, “Connecticut considered imposing criminal penalties
against parents who fail to seek prosecution” in some statutory rape cases. NOY
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“are enforced largely by how angry the parents of [one] party
are”173 or “as a means of policing their children’s sexuality.”174
Statutory rape remains very gendered.175 The vast majority
of defendants remain male, and the victims remain female.176
Prosecutors and courts continue to be concerned primarily with
protecting certain girls, rather than protecting all girls and boys
from adult exploitation.177 Like other constructions of normative
sexuality, statutory rape is also highly racialized.178
S. DAVIS & JENNIFER TWOMBLY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STATE LEGISLATORS’
HANDBOOK FOR STATUTORY RAPE ISSUES 4 (2000).
173. John Gramlich, New Laws Take ‘Romeo’ Into Account, PEW CHARITABLE
TR.
(July
16,
2007),
http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-andanalysis/blogs/stateline/2007/07/16/new-laws-take-romeo-into-account (last
visited Feb. 14, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
174. See COCCA, JAILBAIT, supra note 19, at 137 (stating also that some
parents may be trying to “protect [their children] from potentially coercive
relationships”). A recent typical example involved two teenagers, with the girl’s
father threatening her boyfriend “to stay away from his daughter or he would
press charges.” David Erickson, 18-Year-Old Missoula Man Arrested for
Statutory
Rape
of
15-Year-Old,
MISSOULIAN
(June
22,
2016),
http://missoulian.com/news/ local/year-old-missoula-man-arrested-for-statutoryrape-of-/article_40508bf6760 e-5c95-b734-dc1095ef638e.html (last visited Feb.
14, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). The boy was
eventually arrested. Id.
175. As one scholar describes it, “we [cannot] extricate the male-on-female
image” from the offense. Kay L. Levine, No Penis, No Problem, 33 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 357, 404 (2006) [hereinafter Levine, No Penis, No Problem].
176. See FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SEX OFFENSES
REPORTED VIA NIBRS IN 2013, at 11 (2015), https://www.fbi.gov/aboutus/cjis/ucr/nibrs/2014/resource-pages/nibrs-report_sexoffenses_2013_12-1-15.pdf
(identifying “female” and “male” as the most common attributes of victims and
offenders, respectively). Studies consistently find that over 90% of reported
victims are female and offenders are male. See, e.g., id. (noting that 91% of
victims were female, and 91% of offenders were male); TROUP-LEASURE &
SNYDER, supra note 6, at 1 (reporting that 95% of cases involve female victims
and male defendants).
177. See, e.g., Hernandez v. State, 754 S.W.2d 321, 326 (Tex. App. 1988)
(“The purpose of the newer statutory rape statute was to prevent imposition
upon females under the age of seventeen by older and presumably more
experienced males.”).
178. See, e.g., Michelle J. Anderson, Diminishing the Legal Impact of
Negative Social Attitudes Toward Acquaintance Rape Victims, 13 NEW CRIM. L.
REV. 644, 645 (2010) (noting that rape narratives come from “a racist and sexist
mythology specific to American history”); see also Godsoe, Perfect Plaintiffs,
supra note 50, at 145–48 (describing the strategy of positing white, desexed
plaintiffs to make same-sex palatable to the mainstream).
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D. Juvenile Sex Offenders
Despite the stated purpose of protecting minors from
predatory adults, each year hundreds of minors are prosecuted
for peer statutory rape.179 Many more are investigated, arrested,
or charged with related crimes.180 Even very young children are
prosecuted. As noted earlier, in 2012, forty children under
ten-years-old and 461 children between the ages of eleven and
sixteen were adjudicated guilty of statutory rape.181 A 2005
Department of Justice report confirms that minors are prosecuted
for statutory rape, finding that the ages of the victims and
offenders were highly correlated. 182
Many scholars considering statutory rape support its ongoing
use in peer cases.183 Several overlook peer cases, even while
recommending significant reforms to statutory rape.184 Other
179. See FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, supra note 24 (totaling the number
of statutory rape offenders by age, sex, and race).
180. See FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM
CRIME REPORT (2012), https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/nibrs/2012/datatables (last visited Feb. 14, 2017) (including forcible rape, forcible sodomy,
sexual assault with an object, forcible fondling, and incest) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
181. Id.; see, e.g., 3 CHARLES E. TORCIA, WHARTON’S CRIMINAL LAW § 285 n.48
(15th ed. 2015) (collecting cases involving juvenile defendants).
182. TROUP-LEASURE & SNYDER, supra note 6, at 3 (organizing study results
by offender and victim age). This was particularly true in opposite-sex cases,
which constitute the vast majority of cases. See id. (averaging the age
differences in opposite-sex cases to show that male offenders were
approximately six years older than their victims and female offenders were
about nine years older than their victims)..
183. See infra Part III.A (discussing the problems with continued use of
statutory rape laws in peer cases because of the ability of prosecutors to label
the parties “victim” or “offender” based largely on their own discretion, and the
use of these statutes to police gender and sexuality among minors). One
exception may be Frank Zimring who has remarked that “[t]he fourteen-year-old
caught petting with a fourteen-year-old girlfriend should not be regarded as a
felon . . . . [T]he felonization of adolescent sex is based on an invalid analogy
with adult behavior and is an obvious candidate for reform.” ZIMRING, AMERICAN
TRAVESTY, supra note 130, at 125. Zimring does not, however, discuss peer
statutory rape in detail, and although he appears to support some
decriminalization in this area, the scope in terms of age and forum (i.e.
alternative courts) does not appear to be as comprehensive as my proposal. See
id. at 125–27 (focusing only briefly on suggested reforms for nonpredatory peer
sex).
184. See, e.g., Catherine L. Carpenter, On Statutory Rape, Strict Liability,
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scholars justify peer statutory rape to level the playing field for
girls in nominally consensual encounters, or to facilitate the
prosecution of consensual or forcible rape, rationales addressed in
further detail below.185 State laws and the Model Penal Code
(MPC) proposal also maintain peer statutory rape in some
form.186 The peer cases outlined below, and their vague
designations of victims and offenders, underlie my critique of
these rationales and my call for the full decriminalization of peer
adolescent sexuality.187
Just as they are overlooked in legal scholarship, the
constitutional and normative problems with these cases have
garnered scant attention from courts. Three high state courts,
however, recently limited peer statutory rape, expressing deep
concern about the prosecutions.188 The Vermont, Utah, and Ohio
Supreme Courts all struck delinquency adjudications where the
minors deemed offenders were also within the law’s zone of
protection.189 A Ninth Circuit judge also critiqued the prosecution
and the Public Welfare Offense Model, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 313, 383 (2003)
(arguing that statutory rape as a strict liability offense is not justified by the
public welfare offense model due to, inter alia, the diminished riskiness of
sexual activity post-Lawrence and the harshness of statutory rape
punishments); Russell L. Christopher & Kathryn H. Christopher, The Paradox
of Statutory Rape, 87 IND. L.J. 505, 505 (2012) (considering the potential
statutory rape liability of an adult raped by a sexually aggressive juvenile);
Elizabeth Nevins-Saunders, Incomprehensible Crimes: Defendants with Mental
Retardation Charged with Statutory Rape, 85 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1067, 1067 (2010)
(arguing that prosecuting mentally retarded defendants for a strict liability
crime like statutory rape is unjust).
185. See COCCA, JAILBAIT, supra note 19, at 72–73 (identifying feminist
concerns about statutory rape laws).
186. See infra Appendix A (providing the minimum age of offenders under
the MPC and state statutory rape laws).
187. See In re D.B., 950 N.E.2d 528, 533 (Ohio 2011) (“[W]hen two children
under the age of 13 engage in sexual conduct with each other, each child is both
an offender and a victim, and the distinction between those two terms breaks
down.”); In re Z.C. 165 P.3d 1206, 1213–14 (Utah 2007) (concluding that charges
against both parties in a sexual encounter between two minors leads to “an
absurd result not intended by the legislature”); In re G.T., 758 A.2d 301, 309 (Vt.
2000) (invalidating the Vermont statutory rape statute in cases where the
offender is also a victim because they fall under the age of consent).
188. See cases cited supra note 187 (introducing the three cases discussed in
this Section).
189. See supra note 187 (outlining the analysis of the courts). These courts
cite at least four rationales for their reversal of peer statutory rape prosecutions:
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of minors for consensual sexual experimentation.190 Capturing
the two central concerns of overcriminalization and selective
enforcement, the courts found harms both where one child was
designated the victim and one the offender and where the
children were both labeled victim and offender in concurrent
cases.191
Although each case involved two minors in consensual sexual
conduct, the facts in each differ. In re G.T.,192 the earliest case,
concerned a fourteen-year-old boy, G.T., was adjudicated
delinquent for statutory rape after intercourse with a twelveyear-old neighbor.193 Both minors were under the age of consent
of sixteen.194 M.N., the girl, and G.T. were friends, but had no
sexual contact until one night in October 1995.195 The Court
provides considerable detail about that encounter. M.N. was a
virgin.196 That night, while watching a movie at M.N.’s house,
G.T. kissed M.N.197 He then “pulled [her] legs out straight, pulled
her shorts down, pulled his pants down, and got on top of her. He
continued kissing her with his hands on her shoulders.”198 M.N.
then felt “what she believed was [his] penis in her vagina. G.T.
asked if it hurt, but did not stop when M.N. said it hurt. Although

inconsistent legislative intent with other statutes to protect children; the harsh
consequences of strict liability and sex offenses; overcriminalization; and
discriminatory or selective enforcement. See, e.g., In re D.B., 950 N.E.2d at 533
(discriminatory or selective enforcement); In re Z.C., 165 P.3d at 1208
(inconsistent legislative intent); In re G.T., 758 A.2d at 306 (overcriminalization
and harsh consequences of strict liability). This Article centers on the latter two.
190. See United States v. J.D.T., 762 F.3d 984, 1008 (9th Cir. 2013) (Berzon,
C.J., concurring) (pointing to the offender’s age, the consequences of sexual
offender registration laws, and lack of statutory guidance for the prosecution of
a child offender as sufficient reasons to find that he was not a delinquent).
191. See In re D.B., 950 N.E.2d at 529–30 (labeling one party the victim and
the other the offender); In re Z.C., 165 P.3d at 1207 (prosecuting both parties);
In re G.T., 758 A.2d at 302 (pursuing charges against only one party).
192. 758 A.2d 301, 302 (Vt. 2000).
193. Id. at 302.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
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she was not afraid of him, M.N. was not sure what G.T. would
have done if she had pushed him off of her.”199
M.N.’s mother and boyfriend “unexpectedly” returned home
and saw G.T. “scramble up off” M.N.200 “They ordered him out of
the house,” whereupon “M.N. began crying and ran upstairs,”
later telling her mother what had happened.201 Despite the
implication in this account of non-consensual or even forcible
rape, G.T. was only charged with statutory rape.202 The Court
found that applying the statute to punish a child within the
statutory zone of protection reached an absurd result not
intended by the legislature.203 One justice dissented—the only
dissent in the three cases.204 He argued that this was really a
case of forcible rape, but because “[t]he prosecutor may have had
difficulty proving” this, the statutory rape charges were properly
brought and sustained.205
Both a thirteen-year-old girl and a twelve-year-old boy were
prosecuted in In re Z.C.206 for “consensual intercourse.”207 The
Utah statute defines children as those under fourteen.208 The girl,
Z.C., became pregnant, which likely underlay in part the
prosecution.209 The juvenile court adjudicated both children
delinquent for felony child sex abuse, but imposed different
punishments on them.210 The boy was put on probation and Z.C.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. See id. at 309 (“We agree . . . that the statute is intended as a shield for
minors and not a sword against them.”).
204. Id. at 309 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
205. Id. at 309–10. As discussed infra Part IV.A.1.2, the argument that
statutory rape laws should be maintained to facilitate prosecution in “real,” i.e.
forcible and non-consensual rape, cases continue to have great resonance for
prosecutors and policymakers.
206. 165 P.3d 1206 (Utah 2007).
207. See id. at 1207 n.1 (explaining that the court uses the term
“consensual” although the age of consent is fourteen). Peer statutory rape is
disproportionally enforced when a teenaged girl becomes pregnant. See
discussion infra note 266.
208. Id. at 1208.
209. Id. at 1207.
210. Id.
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was given what the appellate court deemed a “relatively light
punishment,” which included obeying her parents, writing an
essay regarding her baby and the effects of her action on the
baby, having no unsupervised contact with the boy, providing a
DNA sample, and paying the DNA processing fee.211 Only Z.C.
appealed.212 The Court held that applying the statute to treat the
girl simultaneously as a victim and as an offender was absurd
and not intended by the legislature.213 Accordingly, it vacated
Z.C.’s delinquency adjudication and declined to reach her
constitutional claim of equal protection.214
In re D.B.215 differs from the prior cases because it involved
two boys.216 The Ohio statute at issue defines sexual activity with
a child younger than thirteen years old as rape, a first-degree
felony.217 D.B., a twelve-year-old at the time, was charged with
nine counts of rape for encounters with M.G., an eleven-year-old
boy, and one count for an incident with A.W., another twelveyear-old boy.218 After D.B. moved to dismiss the complaint, the
prosecutor dropped the charge related to A.W. and amended the
indictment to allege that D.B. raped M.G. with force or the threat
of force.219 The trial court found no force and dismissed these
counts. 220
The testimony at trial was somewhat contradictory but the
encounters were unequivocally consensual. Indeed M.G. explicitly
testified that he consented verbally to anal and oral sex with
D.B.221 He also testified that, although D.B. was considerably
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 1208.
214. Id.
215. 950 N.E.2d 528 (Ohio 2011).
216. Id. at 529. I argue in Part III.A.2 that youth are disproportionately
prosecuted for statutory rape for same-sex, particularly male-male, sex. Infra
Part II.A.2.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 529–30.
219. Id. at 530.
220. Id.
221. See Merit Brief of Appellant D.B., In re D.B., 950 N.E.2d 528 (Ohio
2011) (No. 2010-0240), 2010 WL 3468429, at *4 (noting that M.G. would often
receive video games or the use of D.B.’s pool in exchange for sex).
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bigger than him, D.B. did not use his size to intimidate M.G.222
M.G. did say that the boys would wrestle each other, but
admitted it was “just for fun.”223 A.W. testified that he had
witnessed D.B. and M.G. engage in anal sex after D.B. “bribed”
M.G. with video games and the boys wrestled each other, an
activity M.G. admitted “was for fun.”224 M.G. and A.W. testified
that D.B. always initiated the sex and that D.B. bargained for
it.225 A.W. also specified that the two boys never engaged in
sexual conduct until M.G. agreed to the activity and that he never
heard D.B. threaten M.G.226 M.G. first suggested that he give
something to D.B. in exchange for video games. When D.B.
suggested anal sex, M.G. told him that he would “do it if [he]
could play [D.B.’s] video games.”227 The boys’ sexual activity came
to light when A.W. told his mother.228 Even after D.B. was
charged, the three boys remained friends, with A.W. and M.G.
sending D.B. text messages.229
The trial court adjudicated D.B. delinquent of statutory rape
based on its finding of “extensive cajoling, bribery, intimidation,
to the point where[,] . . . eventually. . . it looks like [M.G.] gave in
and did consent.”230 It also considered significant that the sex
“was [D.B.]’s idea,” that D.B. was one year older and bigger, and
that “every single time it was about [D.B.] being sexually
gratified. It wasn’t about M.G.”231 The court sentenced D.B. to
five years of incarceration, suspended the incarceration and
placed D.B. on probation for an indefinite duration.232 It also
ordered him to attend counseling and sex offender treatment.233
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. In re D.B., 950 N.E.2d at 530.
225. Id.
226. Id.; Merit Brief of Appellant D.B., supra note 221, at *3.
227. Id. at *3–4.
228. See id. at *3 (discussing A.W.’s testimony that he agreed to “do it,” but
that his mother interrupted before they could begin).
229. See id. at *4 (explaining how A.W. and M.G. would send D.B. messages
through their video game systems).
230. See id. at *5 (first alteration added).
231. Id. at *5 (quoting Transcript of Record at 202–03, In re D.B., No. 2009
CA 00024, 2009 WL 5062017 (Ohio Ct. App. 2009)).
232. In re D.B., 950 N.E.2d 528, 530–31 (Ohio 2011).
233. Id. at 531 (mandating sex offender counseling); Merit Brief of Appellant
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At the time of the final appeal, DB had been on probation and in
treatment for over two and a half years.234
The courts all reversed the guilty adjudications, but took two
different approaches to the scope of peer statutory rape.235 The
Z.C. court did not prohibit any peer statutory rape prosecutions,
narrowly confining the holding to “situations where no true
victim or perpetrator can be identified.”236 The other two courts
banned all prosecutions of children within the age of statutory
protection, recognizing that the victim-offender overlap renders
unworkable the fair prosecution of minors for statutory rape.237
The reasoning of these cases demonstrate that at least some
courts are becoming frustrated with the use of peer statutory
rape to police adolescent sexuality, and recognize the difficulties,
or impossibility, of appropriately designating victims or
offenders.238 As such, they offer a way forward for addressing this
problematic and ultimately unjust doctrine.239

D.B., supra note 221, at *7 (requiring sex offender treatment).
234. Merit Brief of Appellant D.B., supra note 221, at *7.
235. See In re D.B., 950 N.E.2d at 534 (reasoning that application of the
statute to offenders under thirteen makes the statute unconstitutionally vague);
In re Z.C., 165 P.3d 1206, 1213–14 (Utah 2007) (explaining that charging both
parties leads to an absurd result because the statute requires both a perpetrator
and a victim); In re G.T., 758 A.2d 301, 309 (Vt. 2000) (rendering the statute
inapplicable when the offender is also a victim).
236. In re Z.C., 165 P.3d at 1213. In limiting the holding to narrow
circumstances, the court mentioned considering age as well as greater physical
maturity. See id. (excluding cases involving situations where there is “an
identifiable distinction between the perpetrator and the victim”). Even these
factors, however, do not fully address the selective enforcement problems. See
infra notes 263–269 (identifying cases in which courts selectively used these
criteria or identified the difficulty in applying them to specific cases).
237. See In re D.B., 950 N.E.2d at 534 (recognizing the difficulty of fair
enforcement because the statute promotes arbitrary and discriminatory
application); In re G.T., 758 A.2d at 309 (pointing to the potential for
discriminatory enforcement and interference of the privacy rights of defendants
and victims as reasons to invalidate the law).
238. See In re Z.C., 165 P.3d at 1213–14 (noting that consensual encounters
between children under the age of consent may create difficulty distinguishing
between perpetrator and victim).
239. See In re G.T., 758 A.2d at 309 (charging the state legislature to clarify
whether minors can be both a victim and offender in a consensual sexual
encounter).
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III. Vaguenets

This Part describes vaguenets—broad and under-defined
laws with inevitable selective enforcement—illustrating their
characteristics and harms via an examination of peer statutory
rape. It argues that selective enforcement for peer statutory rape
tracks gender and sexuality norm violations, and that the broad
sweep of the law punishes widespread, mostly harmless conduct.
It then offers the vagueness doctrine as a potential fix.
In his seminal analysis of vagueness, Anthony Amsterdam
identified three bedrock principles of our legal system protected
by the doctrine—notice, fair enforcement, and sufficiently narrow
criminalization.240 As the Ohio Supreme Court recognized in D.B.,
vaguenets, particularly peer statutory rape, present exactly these
harms.241 Overcriminalization takes a different form now than at
the time of Amsterdam’s analysis; contemporary reformers focus
equally if not more on prosecutorial discretion than on police
discretion.242 They are concerned with dismantling the broad
carceral state rather than more narrowly voiding individual
statutes chilling certain people from exercising their rights.243
Nonetheless, the vagueness doctrine’s historic application as a
tool to address substantive equality and liberty concerns can be
refashioned for modern overcriminalization.244 Although
contemporary scholars have largely underestimated it, hints in
recent cases support this use to undergird decriminalization
efforts.245

240. See Amsterdam, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine, supra note 35, at 76–
81 (discussing courts’ approaches to unclear laws that may not sufficiently
define proscribed behavior and thus lead to unequal application).
241. See In re D.B., 950 N.E.2d 528, 534 (Ohio 2011) (holding that the
statute in question violated the vagueness doctrine by failing to sufficiently
guide the court in distinguishing between victims and offenders).
242. See HUSAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION, supra note 11, at 27 (reasoning that
prosecutorial discretion creates injustice).
243. See id. at 18 (arguing that overcriminalization contributes to high rates
of incarceration).
244. See, e.g., In re D.B., 950 N.E.2d at 534 (applying the doctrine to
statutory rape).
245. See supra note 235 (giving three examples discussed in detail
throughout this note).
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A. An Example: Peer Statutory Rape
I use the term “vaguenet” to describe broad and underdefined laws that invite selective enforcement.246 They
criminalize harmless conduct, or conduct bringing some harm,
where the costs of criminalization outweigh the benefits.247 The
scope of covered conduct means that underenforcement is
inevitable, as is a vast gap between the law on the books and the
law in action.248 Like police investigatory dragnets found to
violate the Fourth Amendment, the vaguenet laws sweep in much
innocent conduct in an effort to root out societal undesirables.249
In short, these laws allow enforcement authorities to pick and
choose from a huge pool of potential offenders, hiding their
normative commitments behind the vast breadth of the statute.250
Peer statutory rape is a particularly stark example of a
vaguenet given the immense number of law-breakers, the gap
between empirics and morality about adolescent sex, the lack of a
mens rea requirement in most jurisdictions, and the severe
sanctions and stigma accorded sex offenders.251 This Section
begins with a brief outline of the victim-offender overlap, which
compounds the problem.

246. See Buell, The Upside of Overbreadth, supra note 8, at 1526 (discussing
how statutory overbreadth may lead to discriminatory enforcement).
247. See id. at 1493 (using the example of drug dealing to argue that while
overcriminalization may be necessary to reach all instances of criminal
behavior, there may be means better suited to address the target behavior—i.e.
treatment or other health and welfare policies).
248. See id. at 1525 n.113 (clarifying that the issue is not only
overenforcement against particular classes, but also the failure to enforce the
law equally among other social groups).
249. See, e.g., City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 44–48 (2000)
(concluding that vehicle checkpoints to find illegal drugs lacked individualized
suspicion and thus violated the Fourth Amendment). For a thorough analysis of
the problems with dragnets, see Christopher Slobogin, Government Dragnets,
73 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 107, 110 (2010) (recommending, inter alia, that
dragnets be more narrowly approved based on their proportionate “hit rate” or
their necessity to prevent “significant, specific, and imminent harm”).
250. See HUSAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION, supra note 11, at 17–32 (outlining
how the wide breadth of discretion results in injustice).
251. See supra Part II.B (discussing overcriminalization of juveniles in the
context of peer statutory rape and the high discretion held by prosecutors and
judges that leads to selective enforcement).
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1. The Victim-Offender Overlap

Criminologists describe the intertwined and mutually causal
relationship between victimization and offending as the
“victim-offender overlap.”252 Surprisingly, this theoretical model
has not been applied to peer statutory rape or other crimes for
which the same conduct could be construed to render an
individual either a victim or an offender.253 Yet these mutual
liability crimes, like peer statutory rape, invoke perhaps the
purest type of victim-offender overlap—the victims are potential
offenders and the offenders victims for the same incident.
The overlap between victim and offender is 100% in peer
statutory rape cases.254 The Supreme Court has stated that “so
far as possible the line [between legal and illegal] should be
clear.”255 Where the victims and offenders are unclear, this line is
nonexistent.256 In any given case, criminal law experts and
laypeople alike cannot answer simple questions such as “Who will
be charged? Who caused the harm here? And who was
harmed?”257
252. See Reingle, The Victim-Offender Overlap, supra note 16, at 1
(eschewing the frequently used dichotomy of victim or offender in a theoretical
and empirical discussion of why these categories are not mutually exclusive).
The lines between victims and offenders are blurry in other ways as well. One
significant example is mitigation at sentencing for the victim’s role in an
offense. After a recent comprehensive survey of state sentencing schemes,
Carissa Hessick and Doug Berman demonstrate that at least eighteen states
consider victim wrongdoing as a mitigating factor. See Carissa Byrne Hessick &
Douglas A. Berman, Towards a Theory of Mitigation, 96 B.U. L. REV. 161, 191
(2016) (providing examples of the statutory language recognizing this
mitigation).
253. See Christopher J. Schreck & Eric A. Stewart, The Victim-Offender
Overlap and Its Implications for Juvenile Justice, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
JUVENILE CRIME AND JUVENILE JUSTICE 47, 47–51 (Barry C. Feld & Donna M.
Bishop eds., 2012) (discussing the limited application of the theory due to its
recent rise to prominence).
254. In re D.B., 950 N.E.2d 528, 534 (Ohio 2011). Recall that my definition of
peer statutory rape requires that both parties be under the age of consent.
255. United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 265 (1997) (quoting McBoyle v.
United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931)).
256. See In re D.B., 950 N.E.2d at 534 (concluding that the Ohio statute
criminalizing peer statutory rape is “unconstitutionally vague”).
257. See HUSAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION, supra note 11, at 29 (making this
argument about marijuana possession enforcement).
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The revised MPC draft acknowledges this problem in
narrowing potential liability for minors for peer sexual activity:
“Although hard lines [such as age cut-offs] . . . can create
uncomfortable cliffs of liability, they are necessary to ensure that
equally arbitrary liability does not attach to only one of two
same-aged minor participants in nominally consensual
activity.”258 This risk underlies my more radical proposal,
outlined in detail below, to completely decriminalize peer sex
below the age of consent.
2. Policing Gender & Sexuality
The incredible breadth of statutory rape laws and the
millions of sexually active minors give vast discretion to
prosecutors and parents to pick and choose whom to punish.259 All
three peer state high court opinions outlined above critiqued
this.260 The Z.C. court opined that in most peer statutory rape
cases “where no true perpetrator or victim exists . . . the State
may not create a perpetrator and a victim through selective
prosecution.”261 The G.T. court also expressed “serious concerns”
about the breadth of prosecutorial discretion, noting that
prosecutors essentially have “the power to define the crime”
through their enforcement.262 A federal judge similarly critiqued
the “infinite discretion . . . to assign victim and offender status” in
peer statutory rape cases.263 Because almost all sexually active
minors will never be charged, authority figures define statutory
rape more than perhaps any other crime.264
258. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.5 statutory commentary (AM. LAW INST.,
Discussion Draft No. 2, 2015) (emphasis added).
259. See In re D.B., 950 N.E.2d at 532–33 (warning that without guidelines
for the application of criminal law, statutes may lead to abuse of prosecutorial
discretion).
260. See generally id. See also In re Z.C., 165 P.3d 1206, 1212 n.9 (Utah
2007); In re G.T., 758 A.2d 301, 306 (Vt. 2000).
261. In re Z.C., 165 P.3d at 1213 n.10 (emphasis added).
262. In re G.T., 758 A.2d at 316–17.
263. United States v. JDT, 762 F.3d 984, 1012 (9th Cir. 2013) (Berzon, C.J.,
concurring).
264. See COCCA, JAILBAIT, supra note 19, at 124 (noting that most teen
sexual activity is consensual, so that most cases are reported to prosecution by
parents, health care providers, and teachers).
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The factors used to distinguish between victims and
offenders are not defined by statute, but rather by prosecutors
and parents.265 There appear to be no guidelines for addressing
these cases; indeed, the prosecutors in the cases discussed here
concede this.266 The ad hoc factors they use to distinguish victims
and offenders in peer cases are unrelated to the targeted harm,
sexual exploitation of minors by adults.267 Prosecutors and courts
in the cases discussed here designate offenders based on their
“common sense,” who “initiated” the sexual activity,268 and
“whether the conduct was factually voluntary.”269 The latter
factor is, of course, legally relevant only to a non-consensual or
forcible rape prosecution, not one for statutory rape.270
Even age and maturity are not necessarily definitive criteria
as they are often selectively used and, in the latter case, very
difficult to measure.271 Courts do sometimes accord liability to the
265. See, e.g., In re B.A.H., 845 N.W.2d 158, 166 (Minn. 2014) (mentioning
several factors influencing prosecutorial discretion, including the common
practice of rewarding a party’s cooperation). This not only risks creating a
parental “race to the courthouse” when two minors engage in sex, but also
distorts how cooperation is supposed to work. The cooperator generally receives
a lower sentence, not a designation as a victim. See id. (“Prosecutors
routinely . . . offer less-culpable perpetrators reduced charges in return for
cooperation.”).
266. See, e.g., In re G.T., 758 A.2d 301, 306 (Vt. 2000) (discussing
prosecutorial selective enforcement). Even in the rare instances where
prosecutors’
offices
develop
some
official
guidelines,
these
also
disproportionately target racial minorities and lower-income people. See Rigel
Oliveri, Statutory Rape Law and Enforcement in the Wake of Welfare Reform, 52
STAN. L. REV. 463, 503 n.193 (2000) (contending that statutory rape laws may be
selectively applied to punish minorities or teenage mothers); see also id. at 503
(criticizing an Idaho prosecutor who targeted unwed pregnant teens who applied
for public assistance in order to deter teen pregnancy).
267. See, e.g., In re B.A.H., 845 N.W.2d at 166 (considering who instigated or
took a more dominant role and whether either party has a criminal history or
cooperates with prosecutors).
268. See, e.g., id. (permitting prosecutors to base their discretion on common
sense); In re D.B., 950 N.E.2d 528, 530 (Ohio 2011) (factoring into the
prosecution A.W.’s testimony that D.B. always initiated sexual conduct).
269. United States v. JDT, 762 F.3d 984, 998 (9th Cir. 2013).
270. See In re D.B., 950 N.E.2d at 530 (recounting the lower court’s
dismissal of forcible rape charges for voluntariness, while retaining statutory
rape charges).
271. See id. at 529 (prosecuting a twelve-year-old who engaged in sexual
relations with an eleven-year-old and another twelve-year-old); Oliveri, supra
note 266, at 480 (observing that some immature adult males may relate better
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younger child.272 For instance, in one case of consensual same-sex
conduct, the court mentioned age as a factor in designating one
boy, TC, the offender. TC was five years older than one child, but
the court was silent as to the fact that he was one year younger
than another boy he had sex with—a boy who was designated a
victim.273 Courts have also considered maturity, but differ on
whether this includes physical maturity, emotional maturity, or
both.274 Moreover, it is unclear how different types of maturity
should be assessed.275
I contend that the most frequent factor used in peer statutory
rape cases is conformity to gender and sexuality norms. Statutory
rape embodies gender and sexuality values more than perhaps
any other crime.276 Its enforcement continues to “be more
about . . . sexuality than about age,” . . . “both safeguarding and
punishing adolescent sexuality.”277 Parents tend to report most
often, and, concomitantly, prosecutions proceed most often,
against minors who do not conform to gender and sexuality or
other norms.278
to mature teens than women closer to their own ages).
272. See In re E.R., 197 P.3d 870, 871 (Kan. Ct. App. 2008) (involving a
twelve-year-old
adjudicated
delinquent
for
sexually
fondling
a
fourteen-year-old).
273. See In re TC, 214 P.3d 1082, 1085 (Haw. Ct. App. 2009) (noting the
defendant was twelve while one victim was seven, but only stating that the
second victim was under fourteen). Developmental disabilities can also render
chronological age a poor proxy for maturity. See Nevins-Saunders, supra note
184, at 1076 (arguing that prosecutors should have to establish the mens rea of
defendants with mental retardation to show they understand that people below
the age of majority cannot legally consent to sex). In this case, for instance, TC
was “underdeveloped both mentally and emotionally” and was a special
education student. In re TC, 214 P.3d at 1085.
274. See Jonathan Todres, Maturity, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 1107, 1146–56 (2012)
(highlighting concepts of maturity among different cultures).
275. See id. at 1156–64 (suggesting a more uniform approach to reconcile
differing conceptions of maturity).
276. See Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma Cty., 450 U.S. 464, 476
(1981) (upholding a statutory rape law that only criminalized sex with minor
females, not males).
277. COCCA, JAILBAIT, supra note 19, at 27–28.
278. See Jerome Hunt & Aisha C. Moodie-Mills, The Unfair Criminalization
of Gay and Transgender Youth: An Overview of the Experiences of LGBT Youth
in the Juvenile Justice System, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (June 29, 2012),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/lgbt/report/2012/06/29/11730/theunfair-criminalization-of-gay-and-transgender-youth (last visited Feb. 14, 2017)
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Josh Bowers has aptly described criminal laws as “shells”
that prosecutors may fill with their own content.279 Statutory
rape law is vulnerable to being filled with the deeply gendered
narratives or scripts underlying accounts of sex and rape.280 A
caveat is warranted. I do not contend that all or even many
prosecutors deliberately discriminate against peers in statutory
rape cases on gender or sexuality lines. Rather, I argue that the
immense pool of offenders, the parent-driven complaint process,
and the controversial nature of adolescent sexuality make it very
likely that the categorization of offenders and victims is heavily
influenced by normative views on sexuality.
This Section discusses two ways in which statutory rape
polices gender and sexuality norms: first, minors are
disproportionately prosecuted for same-sex sexual activity, and
second, the designation of victims and offenders reinforces
aggressive male and passive female gender roles.
a. Same-Sex Conduct281
Despite the advent of marriage equality, lesbian, gay,
bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) people continue to be
discriminated against, and disproportionately prosecuted and
punished.282 Joey Mogul has documented the criminalization of
LGBT people, particularly around sexual conduct and

(noting the overrepresentation of LGBTQ youth in the juvenile justice system)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
279. See Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable
Decision Not to Prosecute, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1655, 1659–60 (2010) (describing
prosecutors’ “almost unfettered discretion”).
280. See Bennett Capers, Real Rape Too, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1259, 1259 (2011)
(arguing that the criminal justice system fails to recognize or punish the rape of
male victims).
281. I focus here on same-sex sexual conduct, rather than minors who
self-identify as lesbian, gay, or bisexual, because of the fluidity of gender
identities and sexual desire, something particularly prevalent among
contemporary adolescents. See Jessica A. Clarke, Inferring Desire, 63 DUKE L.J.
525, 541–43 (2013) (reporting this fact and critiquing the law’s failure to
recognize this fluidity).
282. See JOEY L. MOGUL ET AL., QUEER (IN)JUSTICE 72–81 (2011) (describing
generally the treatment of LGBT people in criminal courts).
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underenforced crimes—crimes like peer statutory rape.283 LGBT
minors are also disproportionately represented in the juvenile
and criminal justice systems and punished for sexual conduct.284
Statutory rape is no exception. First, the statutory scheme in
several states punishes same-sex sexual activity more harshly.285
Second, although there is no comprehensive means of tracking
same-sex versus opposite-sex cases, experts agree minors are
likely more often prosecuted for the former. Carolyn Cocca,
author of the only book-length study of American statutory rape,
concludes that “[t]here is some evidence that prosecutors under
the laws have disproportionately targeted [same-sex]
relationships.”286 Illustrative of this is one recent Massachusetts
case involving thirteen-year-old and fifteen-year-old boys.287 The
younger boy’s parents told their son that homosexuality was
“morally wrong” and “pressure[d]” the police to prosecute.288
At least two states explicitly exclude same-sex adolescents
from their mitigating age-gap provisions, and several more states
have separate laws criminalizing sodomy with minors which do
not contain age-span provisions. Texas and Alabama explicitly
exclude lesbian and gay minors from the provision benefitting
other minors.289 The Texas statute offers an affirmative defense
283. See id. at 64–68 (uncovering sexual bias against LGBT people by those
in the criminal justice system).
284. See Hunt & Moodie-Mills, supra note 278 (reporting that in 2012,
LGBT youth represented five to seven percent of the nation’s youth population
and thirteen to fifteen percent of those in the juvenile justice system).
285. See Michael J. Higdon, Queer Teens and Legislative Bullies: The Cruel
and Invidious Discrimination Behind Heterosexist Statutory Rape Laws, 42 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 195, 227 (2008) (noting that states such as Texas do not have a
Romeo and Juliet exception, which means that “an eighteen-year-old male who
has consensual sex with a sixteen-year-old male would be guilty of a felony”); see
also id. (describing how California and Alabama distinguish between sexual
intercourse and sodomy, resulting in much harsher penalties for sex between
adolescents of the same sex).
286. COCCA, JAILBAIT, supra note 19, at 10; see also Higdon, supra note 285,
at 241–46 (describing a statutory-rape case in which an eighteen-year-old did
not qualify for the Romeo and Juliet exception because he engaged in oral sex
with another male).
287. See Commonwealth. v. Washington W., 928 N.E.2d 908, 913–14 (Mass.
2010) (concluding that the older boy had met the high bar of a reasonable
showing of selective prosecution based on sexual orientation).
288. Id. at 911 n.2.
289. See generally ALA. CODE § 13A-6-62 (1975); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
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to statutory rape where the defendant “was not more than three
years older than the victim and of the opposite sex.”290 The second
group of states, including California, Kentucky, and Missouri, do
not offer the defense either.291 Although this may be due to a
legislative oversight rather than deliberate differentiation, these
exclusions, nonetheless, leave adolescents engaging in same-sex
activity more vulnerable to prosecution and punishment than
their peers and send a message about the perceived deviancy of
gay and lesbian sex.292
Even in the bulk of states with gender-neutral statutes,
minors are likely more vulnerable to prosecution for same-sex
activity due to ongoing discomfort and even disgust with
same-sex sex, particularly by parents.293 Analogously to the
perception of youth of color as engaging in “more dangerous
behavior” than white youth despite the data, adults continue to
deem same-sex sexual activity more abnormal or harmful than
opposite-sex sexual activity.294 Demonstrating this, a recent
report found that LGBT youth are significantly more likely to be
disciplined for public displays of affection at school than their
heterosexual peers.295
§ 21.11 (West 2009).
290. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.11 (West 2009) (emphasis added).
291. Compare CAL. PENAL CODE § 286 (West 2013), with CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 261.5(b) (West 2011).
292. At least one high court has found these discrepancies to violate equal
protection. See State v. Limon, 122 P.3d 22, 40 (Kan. 2005) (holding that a
statute that punished opposite-sex statutory rape much less severely than
same-sex statutory rape violated federal and state equal protection provisions).
293. See AMY A. ADELE HASINOFF, SEXTING PANIC: RETHINKING
CRIMINALIZATION, PRIVACY, AND CONSENT 14 (2015) (opining that these parents,
and those upset about the race or class of their children’s partners, “are
responsible for a substantial proportion of statutory rape prosecutions”).
294. See Henning, supra note 67, at 416 (remarking that racial
disproportionality in the juvenile justice system is partially driven by racial bias
that results in the increased visibility and appearance of dangerousness among
adolescents in poor communities of color).
295. See Vickie L. Henry & Michelle Wiener, It’s Not Your Imagination:
LGBTQ Youth Are Disproportionately Punished in School, GLAD (Apr. 7, 2015),
http://www.glad.org/youth/post/its-not-your-imagination-lgbtq-youth-are-dispropor
tionate ly-punished (last visited Oct. 16, 2016) (noting that LGBTQ youth are up
to three times more likely to become involved in the juvenile or criminal justice
system as a result of school discipline and that 28% report unequal discipline for
public displays of affections).
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Several recent cases illustrate this pattern. In 2012, an
eighteen-year-old Florida high school student was prosecuted for
sex with her fourteen-year-old girlfriend, a student at the same
school.296 The younger girls’ parents initiated the prosecution as
soon as they learned of the relationship, despite their daughter’s
protestations that it was consensual.297 The older girl, Kaitlyn
Hunt, was expelled from high school and faced up to fifteen years
in prison. She ultimately accepted a plea deal including four
months incarceration and two years house arrest.298 Although the
prosecutor argued that Kaitlyn’s sexual orientation had “nothing
to do with” her prosecution—and that the Florida law
criminalizes adolescent sex of any “combination”—there is no
doubt that the vast majority of sexually active adolescents escape
prosecution.299 Deeply religious parents and sexual activity
deemed abnormal in their community likely played a role in the
initiation of the case.
Male gay sex has always been less palatable to the
mainstream than lesbian sex, so it is perhaps not surprising that
a number of the scant-reported peer statutory rape cases involved
two or more boys.300 Indeed, D.B., the most recent in the trio of
decisions limiting peer statutory rape, involved a twelve-year-old
boy adjudicated delinquent for anal sex with an eleven-year-old
boy, a case that was initiated by the eleven-year-old’s father.301
The harsh treatment of same-sex conduct is also reflected in a
recent Minnesota case where a fourteen-year-old was sentenced
to “indefinite probation,” completion of a residential treatment
296. See generally Daniel Arkin, Florida Mom Alleges Anti-Gay Bias After
Daughter Expelled, Arrested, NBC NEWS, http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/
2013/05/20/18376456-florida-mom-alleges-anti-gay-bias-after-daughter-expelledarrested (last visited Feb. 14, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
297. Id.
298. Sara Ganim, Gay Florida Teen Accepts Plea Deal, Prosecutor Says,
CNN (Oct. 3, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/10/02/justice/florida-gay-teenkaitlyn-hunt-case/ (last visited Feb. 14, 2017) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
299. Id.
300. See generally WILLIAM ESKRIDGE, DISHONORABLE PASSIONS: SODOMY
LAWS IN AMERICA, 1861–2003 (2008) (discussing the history of anti-sodomy laws
and demonstrating that lesbian sex has been criminalized and punished far less
than male gay sex).
301. In re D.B., 950 N.E.2d 528, 530 (Ohio 2011).
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program, and registration as a sex offender for anal sex with boy
one year younger than him.302
The judge in another recent case called the ten-year-old
defendant “the poster child for delinquency” for engaging in
consensual same-sex activity.303 The prosecutors did not specify
why they chose to prosecute this peer case, but did concede that
they knew of no other statutory rape prosecution where the
defendant was under age twelve.304 The Ninth Circuit affirmed
the boy’s delinquency adjudication for oral and anal sex with
three boys, where all four boys were under the age of consent.305
b. (Racialized) Gender Norms
As it did historically, statutory rape polices masculine and
feminine roles. Minor males are prosecuted significantly more
frequently than females.306 Boys are sometimes prosecuted even
when they are the younger or the less mature party.307 This
302. See generally In re B.A.H., 845 N.W.2d 158, 162 (Minn. 2014). See also
In re TC, 214 P.3d 1082, 1098 (Haw. Ct. App. 2009) (denying the argument that
the state improperly targeted the older boy because he engaged in same-sex acts
by concluding that the “[s]tate’s exercise of prosecutorial discretion in this case
was not constitutionally infirm”).
303. United States v. JDT, 762 F.3d 984, 992 (9th Cir. 2014).
304. See id. at 995–96 (contending that “Congress did not intend for the
statutory-rape provision to be used to prosecute a 10-year-old prepubescent boy
for knowing conduct, and that the trial prosecutor arbitrarily disregarded
Congress’ intention”).
305. Id. at 984. A writ of certiorari was declined November 2, 2015. The
government dropped the allegations against two of the boys after trial. Id. at
988. As noted earlier, the concurrence expressed concern with the trial court’s
reasoning and peer statutory rape prosecutions. Id. at 1008–15 (Berzon, C.J.,
concurring).
306. See BRITTANY L. SMITH & GLEN A. KERCHER, CRIME VICTIMS INSTITUTE,
ADOLESCENT
SEXUAL
BEHAVIOR
AND
THE
LAW
13
(2011),
http://www.crimevictimsinstitute.org/documents/Adolescent_Behavior_3.1.11.pd
f (describing cases from around the country). See generally TROUP-LEASURE &
SNYDER, supra note 6, at 4. Most of the recent reported cases of opposite-sex peer
conduct also illustrate this pattern—either the boys are prosecuted or, less
frequently, both boys and girls. See, e.g., Brief for Appellate at *1, Jordan F. v.
Arizona, No. CV-09-0266-PR, 2009 WL 5149184 (Ariz. Sept. 18, 2009)
[hereinafter Brief for Appellate] (describing the prosecution of one boy for inschool sexual encounters between multiple girls and boys).
307. To take just one example, a twelve-year-old boy was prosecuted for
“sexually fondling a fourteen-year-old girl who was a willing participant.” In re
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paradigm reflects both the increased blame placed on boys for
consensual sexual behavior and the heightened protection
granted to at least some girl victims.
A recent case illustrates that this gender bias can determine
the designation of victims and offenders from the very start of a
case.308 During “free time” in one Arizona middle school class, a
group of similarly aged students—four boys and three girls—sat
and studied together.309 The students began playing a “game that
consisted of limited acts of mutual sexual contact whereby the
boys would touch the female students’ fully clothed breasts, and
the female students touched the boys’ genitals over and under the
clothing.”310 All parties played willingly.311 When a teacher
learned about “the game” from one of the participating female
students, Jordan, a thirteen-year-old African-American boy, “was
handcuffed and arrested at school.”312 A “massive investigation”
was launched, almost exclusively focused on the boys.313 Jordan
was ultimately charged with felony sexual abuse for touching a
girls’ breast over her shirt.314
In affirming Jordan’s guilty adjudication, the appellate court
acknowledged that “female students may have engaged in sexual
contact” with Jordan and another boy at school—something the
girls had admitted—but reiterated that prosecutors have “wide
latitude [to] determin[e] who to [charge].”315 The court relied on
the fact that the boys purportedly engaged in more contact with
E.R., 197 P.3d 870, 871 (Kan. Ct. App. 2008). A Kansas appellate court reversed
the delinquency adjudication, interpreting that state’s statute to require “the
offender to be older than the victim.” Id. at 871–72.
308. See generally In re Jordan F., No. 1 CA-JV 08-0191, 2009 WL 2525311,
at *1–3 (Ariz. Ct. App. Aug. 18. 2009), petition for reh’g denied. Another boy was
charged with various sex offenses and a third boy was investigated but not
charged. Id. at *1 n.1.
309. See Brief for Appellate, supra note 306, at *4 (describing that the free
time was meant for students to study in group sessions).
310. Id. at *4–5.
311. See id. at *5 (noting that one of the participants in this game alleged
that Jordan touched her chest).
312. Id. at *5–6.
313. Id. at *5.
314. See In re Jordan F., 2009 WL 2525311, *1–3 (Ariz. Ct. App. Aug. 18.
2009) (affirming the lower court’s decision).
315. Brief for Appellate, supra note 298, at *1.
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more people than the girls (“more victims”) because there was one
more boy than girl in the group.316 It ignored the key facts that
the “game” of sexual touching was mutually consensual and that
some of the girls may have engaged in more invasive touching—
inside the pants rather than over the shirt.317
This fact pattern is not atypical; in another recent case, the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that a boy had
met the high bar of demonstrating a reasonable showing of
discrimination where only the boy was prosecuted after he and
three girls below the age of consent had “mutually consensual
oral sex.”318 Emphasizing that “prosecutorial discretion is not
boundless,” the court ordered the state to turn over discovery
related to its relative prosecutions of boys and girls.319 The boy
was fourteen and in high school, two of the girls were
twelve-years-old and one eleven, all middle school students—
small age and maturity differences that the court did not find
definitively supported the prosecutor’s refusal to charge the
girls.320
Nonetheless, the prosecutor argued that even if the discovery
showed that males were disproportionately charged with peer
statutory rape, the documented link between rape and gender
would “say little or nothing about the selectivity of a decision to
charge a male with rape versus a female” because perhaps males
are more likely to rape.321 This circular argument makes no sense
where all the parties are below the age of consent and thus
equally liable under the statute. Essentially the link between
masculinity and offending exists because the prosecutor has
316. See id. at *5 (arguing that the “State’s investigation focused almost
exclusively on Jordan, with over [thirty] student interviews focused on Jordan’s
conduct, compared to [four] interviews relating to the females’ conduct”).
317. See id. (noting the thirty interviews investigators conducted related to
Jordan and four interviews related to the three girls’ conduct).
318. Commonwealth. v. Bernardo B., 900 N.E.2d 834, 844 (Mass. 2009). The
prosecution also noted that the boy was “a football player,” a fact presumably
enhancing his masculinity and related offender status. Id. at 849.
319. See id. (including principles of equal protection in its analysis, which
prohibit the discriminatory application of impartial laws).
320. See id. at 846–49 (noting that the two-year age difference is not
inconsequential because it is a factor in determining “whether [the boys’]
behavior was so dissimilar from that of the girls in nature, kind, and degree”).
321. Id. at 846.
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defined peer statutory rape to manifest that link, i.e. prosecuting
only boys.
Gendered roles are sometimes translated into inculpating
factors in both same-sex and opposite-sex encounters. As
discussed earlier, in D.B., the trial court contrasted the
offender/boy, who initiated the sexual contact purportedly for his
sole gratification, with the passive, feminized boy as the victim,
despite the boys’ close age proximity and evidence that the sex
was consensual.322 Another court described consensual anal sex
between two similarly aged boys as “reflecting an almost
archetypal perpetrator and victim of sexual conduct.”323 The court
designated as the offender the boy who initiated conduct, even
noting critically that this boy provided lubricant.324 The more
passive boy, who resisted the purported offender’s suggestions
until ultimately capitulating (playing coy?), was designated the
victim.325 The prosecutors in an opposite-sex case followed the
same narrative in designating the boy an offender and all of the
consenting girls as victims.326 What brought the boy offender
status? That he “pushed relentlessly for what he wanted” and “all
of the sex acts involved [him] obsessively seeking his own passion
and pleasure.”327
On the flip side, less feminine behavior can erode victim
status. I have previously described this dynamic in the context of
prostitution versus trafficking; the same binary of “good girls”
and “bad girls” colors statutory rape law.328 Girls who do not
reflect the chaste feminine ideal may themselves be punished, or
exploitation they suffer may go unrecognized.329 In the relatively
322. In re D.B., 950 N.E.2d 528, 108 (Ohio 2011).
323. In re B.A.H., 845 N.W.2d 158, 166 (Minn. 2014).
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. Commonwealth. v. Bernardo B., 900 N.E.2d 834, 844 (Mass. 2009).
327. Id.
328. Godsoe, Punishment as Protection, supra note 50, at 1367.
329. See COCCA, JAILBAIT, supra note 19, at 11–15, 164 (outlining the
historic promiscuity defense). Although jurisdictions have abolished the
promiscuity defense, the behavior of victims continues to be scrutinized. For
instance, in a recent civil case, the L.A. school district argued that a fourteenyear-old Latina girl was “partly to blame” for the statutory rape by her adult
math teacher because “she lied to her mother so that she could have sex with
her teacher.” Kate Picker, School District: Student Is Partly to Blame for Sex
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rare instances when a girl is prosecuted for opposite-sex peer
statutory rape, it is often because her pregnancy renders her less
victim-like and more culpable. This was, for instance, the
situation in Z.C. where both Z.C. and her male partner were
charged.330
These victim and offender roles are highly racialized. One
scholar has aptly described statutory rape as “a story about white
women’s vulnerability” and about “black male culpability.”331 As
such, it conforms to the historic and ongoing construction of Black
men as overly violent and sexual, and “inherent[ly] deviant” with
an “allegedly insatiable appetite for white women.”332 Richard
Delgado also charts the racialized contours of statutory rape. He
describes the crime as primarily applied against “two groups:
men . . . who have sex with girls from ‘good homes,’ and minority
men, who are punished if they commit a crime of having sex with
white women or impregnate a woman of color [who receives
public benefits].”333 One highly publicized case illustrates this
dynamic: Genarlow Wilson, a Black seventeen-year-old, was
convicted of aggravated child molestation and sentenced to ten
years in prison without parole for engaging in consensual oral sex
with Teacher, TIME MAG. (Nov. 14, 2014), http://time.com/3586324/schooldistrict-student-is-partly-to-blame-for-sex-with-teacher (last visited Mar 2,
2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). An analogous
approach to adolescent female sexuality is found in sexting prosecutions. Girls
who violate feminine-role models, for instance by photographing themselves in
provocative or nude poses, are often sanctioned more severely than youth who
harm other people, for instance by sharing the photos without permission. See
HASINOFF, supra note 285, at 46 (collecting cases).
330. State ex rel Z.C., 165 P.3d 1206, 1211 (Utah 2007).
331. See Goodwin, Law’s Limits, supra note 46, at 493–95 (“For example,
Virginia, Georgia, Mississippi, Alabama, and Louisiana enacted race-specific
rape law, which specifically mandated tougher sentencing against Black males
convicted of raping white women.”). I have previously described the deeply
entrenched “social taboo” of this race and sex pairing. See Godsoe, Perfect
Plaintiffs, supra note 50, at 141 (noting that the opposite pairing—white man
and Black woman—was implicitly condoned and underlay in part the success of
the miscegenation challenge in Loving v. Virginia).
332. PATRICIA HILL COLLINS, BLACK SEXUAL POLITICS: AFRICAN AMERICANS,
GENDER AND THE NEW RACISM 161 (2004); see also id. at 153–54 (describing how
Black male athletes “mark the boundary between admiration and fear, speak to
the tension linking Western efforts to control [b]lack men, and [b]lack men’s
resistance to this same process”).
333. Richard Delgado, No: Selective Enforcement Targets ‘Unpopular’ Men,
A.B.A. J. 1, 86 (1996).
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with a fifteen-year-old white girl.334 Most commentators felt that
the couple’s racial makeup fueled the prosecution, and following
significant public outcry, Wilson was released from prison
early.335
The scant data confirms that Black and Latino men and
youths are likely disproportionately prosecuted for statutory
rape.336 In the most recent year for which data are available,
2012, 1,100 of the 5,358 offenders were Black, or about 20.5%
versus about 13% of the population.337 One stark, if isolated
example is the 2003 statutory rape “most wanted” list of one
California county on which all of the thirty-two young “wanted”
men were either African-American or Latino.338 Indeed, fears of
racial disproportionality led some African-American legislators to
recently oppose increased federal penalties for statutory rape.339
Relatedly, male victims continue to go unrecognized.340
Indeed, female adult statutory rape of adolescent men was the
334. Wilson v. State, 631 S.E.2d 391, 392 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006); see also
MICHELE A. PALUDI, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TEEN VIOLENCE AND VICTIMIZATION 58–
59 (Michele A. Paludi ed., 2011) (“In adult court, Wilson was convicted of
aggravated child molestation, registered as a sex offender, and sentenced to ten
years in jail, the mandatory minimum sentence under Georgia law.”).
335. See Michael Kent Curtis & Shannon Gilreath, Transforming Teenagers
into Oral Sex Felons: The Persistence of the Crime Against Nature After
Lawrence v. Texas, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 155, 175–79 (2008) (finding the
punishment to be grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime). This
case also illustrates the disproportionate punishment for some types of sex—
whereas Georgia law at the time made oral sex with a minor a felony, vaginal
intercourse with a minor was a misdemeanor. Shortly after the Wilson case, the
state legislature amended the statute to reduce oral sex to a misdemeanor. See
generally GA. CODE ANN. §16-6-2(d).
336. See Kate Sutherland, From Jailbird to Jailbait: Age of Consent Laws
and the Construction of Teenage Sexualities, 9 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 313,
323 (2003) (citing a study that showed out of the thirty-five people who were
prosecuted, thirty-two were men who identified themselves as Hispanic or
black).
337. See generally UNIFORM CRIME REPORT, supra note 24. The DOJ does not
appear to collect statistics about Latinos for statutory rape. More generally,
there is a scarcity of detailed data on statutory rape offenders and victims.
338. See Sutherland, supra note 336, at 328 (compiling numbers from San
Bernardino County District Attorney, Statutory Rape Prosecution, and Wanted
for Criminal Statutory Rape).
339. See COCCA, JAILBAIT, supra note 19, at 47 (speaking to a concern that
minorities would be disproportionately prosecuted).
340. See Levine, No Penis, No Problem, supra note 175, at 358 (noting that
societal gender roles “tend to illuminate acts of male perpetration and female
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subject of two popular Saturday Night Live skits within the last
year alone.341 The following reaction to a recent case of an adult
teacher having sex with minor boys also demonstrates the
devaluation of male victims:
A beautiful woman “rapes” teenage boys! Now, please, can
someone who knows more about this explain this to me? As I
remember, boys that age are always ready for sex . . . No one
was raped here! It was all just about conquest. Those boys are
laughing and bragging about it, and I would bet my house on
that!342

Finally, the punishments imposed on girls versus boys reveal
gendered patterns. The boys in the statutory rape cases discussed
herein, such as Z.C.’s partner, typically receive incarceration or
probation, as well as sex offender “treatment” and sometimes
registration.343 In contrast, Z.C. received a much lighter if more
paternalistic punishment: She was ordered to, inter alia, obey her
parents, and to write an essay regarding her child and her
actions on the child.344

victimization while keeping underground the existence of female-perpetrated
abuse and male victimization”).
341. See Zeba Blay, “SNL” Did a Sketch About Rape Again and It Still
HUFFINGTON
POST
(Jan.
25,
2016),
Wasn’t
Funny,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/ snl-did-a-sketch-about-rape-again-and-itstill-wasnt-funny_us_56a64641e4b076 aadcc736e5 (last visited Mar. 2, 2017)
(discussing two skits on SNL about a ‘hot’ female teacher having sex with a
minor teenaged boy) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
Although some, like this writer, criticized the skit, other commentators found it
funny or harmless. See Michael Sleazak, Ronda Rousey Hosts SNL: Watch Video
of
the
Best
and
Worst
Sketches,
TVLINE
(Jan.
23,
2016),
http://tvline.com/2016/01/23/ronda-rousey-hosts-saturday-night-live-snl-recapvideo (last visited Mar. 2, 2017) (quoting a commentator Patrick: “The statutory
rape trials are hilarious . . . Keep em[sic] coming”) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
342. Sharon Teal Coray, In Teacher Sex Case, Blame the Boys, Too, SALT
LAKE TRIB. (July 15, 2015), http://www.sltrib.com/opinion/2727266-155/letter-inteacher-sex-case-blame (last visited Mar. 2, 2017) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
343. In re Z.C., 165 P.3d 1206, 1210 (Utah 2007). Boys in same-sex cases
seem to garner particularly harsh sentences. For instance, one fourteen-year-old
was sentenced to “indefinite probation,” completion of a residential treatment
program, and registration as a sex offender. In re B.A.H., 845 N.W.2d 158, 162
(Minn. 2014).
344. In re Z.C., 165 P.3d at 1210.
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3. Punishing Normal
Cases such as Z.C., where both minors were charged, starkly
demonstrate the harms of overcriminalization. As the court there
put it: “In this situation, there is no discernible victim that the
law seeks to protect, only culpable participants that the law seeks
to punish.”345 The system thus operates as a one-way ratchet—
sweeping in many more offenders than victims. Recall the
opening example of the middle school “sex party” where all the
young people were arrested and charged.346
The stigma of statutory rape adjudication and its harsh
punishments compound the harms of its broad sweep. The Z.C.
court distinguished statutory rape and its harsh consequences
from other mutual liability crime, such as fornication, and
questioned labeling and punishing such behavior as “child
rape.”347 The harsh penalties also informed the G.T. court’s
scrutiny.348 The G.T. court characterized peer statutory rape as
nonsensically rendering “every sexually active child under
fourteen years of age a child abuse victim, perpetrator, or
both.”349
Even where prosecutors do not charge all of the parties, the
threat of it is omnipresent. As noted earlier, almost half of high
school students have had sexual intercourse, 20% as early as
ninth grade, and millions of minors have had intercourse or oral
345. Id. at 1212.
346. See Four Brown Deer, supra note 2 (believing that the teens should be
charged with first and second degree sexual assault of a child).
347. See In re Z.C., 165 P.3d at 1210 (writing that the legislature passed a
bill that amended the diversion statute to avoid “the application of the child sex
abuse statute”).
348. See id. at 1213 (admonishing the prosecutor because labeling someone a
child abuser “can have serious consequences that were not intended by the
legislature”); see also United States v. JDT, 762 F.3d 984, 1008–11 (9th Cir.
2014) (Berzon, C.J., concurring) (outlining the harsh consequences of statutory
rape conviction including possible sex offender registration, even for juveniles);
see also Goodwin, Law’s Limits, supra note 46, at 487 (noting that the
“untenable, absurd results” of statutory rape laws applied against minors
“frequently impose legal or extralegal burdens on [them] that may exceed those
of adult, convicted rapists”).
349. In re G.T., 758 A.2d 301, 304 (Vt. 2000) (emphasis added). The
dissenting judge overlooked the punitive nature of the juvenile justice system,
supporting the delinquency sentence because of the system’s purported
rehabilitative role. Id. at 310 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
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sex by the age of thirteen.350 Given this reality, it is impossible for
peer statutory rape laws to be enforced at anywhere near the
level of prevalence of the offense. The statute itself offers no hint
as to who will or should be prosecuted. This line between deviant
and normal adolescent behavior will likely turn on illegitimate
criteria, such as race.351
Criminalization is especially pernicious here because it
punishes behavior that is both widespread and developmentally
normal for adolescents. The two concepts are related; one
indication of normality is how typical a practice is. Dictionaries
define normal as “conforming to a standard; usual, typical, or
expected” and “usual or ordinary: not strange.”352 The high
prevalence of peer adolescent sex certainly renders it “typical or
expected.”
Medical experts also tell us that peer child and adolescent
sexuality is normal and not usually harmful.353 The medical
literature confirms that it is developmentally normal for minors
to experiment with sexual touching, oral sex, and even sexual
intercourse at a wide range of ages.354 Many young children
masturbate, and kiss and touch the genitals of other children.355
350. CDC, supra note 7.
351. See Henning, supra note 67, at 427 (noting that criminalization of
typical adolescent behavior, such as “a typical school-yard fight [being] labeled
as felony assault and students who play ‘catch’ with a teacher’s hat [being]
charged with robbery[,]” is highly racialized).
352. Normal, OXFORD DICTIONARIES, http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/
definition/american_english/normal (last visited Mar. 2, 2017) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Normal, MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ normal (last visited Mar. 2, 2017)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
353. Dictionaries also define normal as “mentally and physically healthy.”
Normal, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
normal (last visited Mar. 2, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
354. Physical puberty has been starting earlier, particularly for girls, with
pubertal onset ranging from seven to thirteen-years-old for girls and nine to
fourteen-year-old boys. Experts also confirm that “[s]exual development begins
well before adolescence,” but note that most children under fourteen may not be
physically or emotionally ready for oral sex or intercourse. CLEA MCNEELY,
JOHNS HOPKINS BLOOMBERG SCH. OF PUB. HEALTH, THE TEEN YEARS EXPLAINED
62
(2009),
http://www.jhsph.edu/research/centers-and-institutes/center-foradolescent-health/_includes/_pre-redesign/Interactive%20Guide.pdf (describing
different age groups and each groups inclinations towards sexual activities).
355. See id. (describing the ages of eleven to thirteen as the usual start of
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According to experts, this consensual sexual play is “not
uncommon” and should not usually be a cause for concern.356
Another report outlines the increasingly large number of
minors engaging in sexual activity with another adolescent from
age ten and up: “Sexual fantasy and masturbation episodes
increase between the ages of 10 and 13 . . . [and] by the age of 12
or 13, some young people may pair off and begin dating and
experimenting with kissing, touching, and other physical contact,
such as oral sex.”357 By ages 14 to 16, “both genders experience a
high level of sexual energy,” and by 16 many have “willingly
experienced” intercourse.358 Emphasizing that “[s]exuality is a
vital part of growing up,” researchers emphasize that there is a
very wide range of “normal adolescent behavior” around
sexuality.359
Definitions of sexual disorders reinforce the normalcy of
sexuality among a wide age range of minors. Tellingly, the
definitive definition of mental disorders excludes anyone younger
than sixteen-years-old from being defined as a pedophile (or in
common parlance “child molester”).360 Even those sixteen or older
must be more than five years older than the child, and the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM)
urges caution in diagnosing as pedophiles even individuals “in
late adolescence (i.e. over sixteen) involved in an ongoing sexual
relationship with a twelve- or thirteen-year-old.”361

such sexual activity).
356. See NAT’L CHILD TRAUMATIC STRESS NETWORK, SEXUAL DEVELOPMENT &
BEHAVIOR IN CHILDREN 1–3 (2009), http://www.nctsn.org/sites/default/files/
assets/pdfs/sexualdevelopmentandbehavior.pdf (reporting that most sexual play
is an expression of children’s natural curiosity).
357. MCNEELY, supra note 354, at 62 (emphasis added). The increase at age
ten and up indicates the medical reality that children have sexual thoughts and
contact exploration in early childhood.
358. Id. at 63.
359. This includes same-sex exploration for children who are not gay. Id. at
68.
360. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 49, at 697.
361. Id. For more on the disconnect between the legal and scientific
definitions, see Margo Kaplan, Taking Pedophilia Seriously, 72 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 75, 76 (2015) (arguing that “if we are to conceptualize pedophilia as a
mental illness or disorder, we must rethink how the law approaches it”).
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One court reversing a peer statutory rape adjudication
specifically noted the widespread incidence of childhood
experimentation and adolescent sex, remarking that such laws
“seem deliberately to overcriminalize” and cast doubt on the
legitimacy of the criminal law by punishing “moral[y] neutral, if
not innocen[t]” behavior.362 The court quoted Sanford Kadish’s
seminal article on discretion in opining that such broad and
under-enforced laws “raise basic issues of a morally acceptable
criminal code.”363 Similarly, a Ninth Circuit judge considering a
ten-year-old’s adjudication for anal and oral sex with younger
children expressed concern with punishing “playing doctor.”364
Proposed revisions to the influential MPC also cite the
widespread nature of child and adolescent sexual exploration as a
basis for a significant reduction of peer statutory rape liability:
Many of the behaviors covered by the contact provision are
considered rites of passage during youth and puberty, and
reflect ordinary acts of sexual exploration as one matures.
Indeed, very young children may voluntarily undertake
behavior that would technically meet the definition of sexual
contact out of pure, even if ill-advised, sexual curiosity . . . . In
sum, these provisions reflect the judgment that while certain
kinds of sexual exploration are appropriate for even young
children, that exploration should generally be restricted within
the peer-group range. 365

Accordingly, the MPC drafters recommend a swath of
decriminalization because, while “[i]t may not be ideal that a very
young child engages in kissing, stripping, or ‘petting’ before the
age of twelve, so long as it is nominally consensual and engaged
in with age-appropriate partners, it should not be a subject for
penal law.”366

362. In re G.T., 758 A.2d 301, 306–07 (Vt. 2000) (emphasis added).
363. Id. at 307 (quoting Kadish, supra note 77, at 910).
364. See United States v. JDT, 762 F.3d 984, 1013 (9th Cir. 2014) (Berzon,
C.J., concurring) (“But when two children under twelve years old engage in
sexual conduct with one another, the statute provides no guidance as to who is
the offender and who is the victim.”).
365. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.5 statutory commentary 27–28 (AM. LAW
INST., Discussion Draft No. 2, 2015).
366. Id. at 27. I am not agreeing or disagreeing with the assessment that
this conduct is “not ideal” or “ill-advised.”
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Concern about the criminalization of widespread behavior,
and the lack of “true” victims also led an unusual
decriminalization proponent—a victims rights’ organization—to
call for significant limitations on statutory rape prosecutions.367
The Crime Victims Institute noted that “[g]iven the changing
mores in this country and the increasing acceptance by teenagers
of early sexual intimacies, more and more young people are
finding themselves facing sexual assault charges, whether or not
either partner feels victimized.”368
In short, peer statutory rape functions to punish certain
minors for mostly harmless and widespread conduct. As such, it
reflects the excessive discretion, criminal law, and threat to the
rule of law characteristic of vagueness.
B. A Potential Fix: Vagueness Doctrine
1. Limiting Excessive Discretion
The Supreme Court has identified overly broad enforcement
discretion as the primary concern of the vagueness doctrine.369 As
the Court stated in Kolendar v. Lawson:370 “the more important
aspect of the vagueness doctrine is . . . the requirement that a
legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law
enforcement.”371 Otherwise, sanctions center on “a standardless
sweep that allows policemen, prosecutors, and juries to pursue
their personal predilections.”372 This limitation protects against
due process violations of arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement and enforces the separation of powers by preventing
the legislature from “delegat[ing] basic policy matters to [courts
or the executive branch] for resolution on an ad hoc and

367. See CRIME VICTIMS INSTITUTE, supra note 306, at 18–30 (describing
cases from a variety of states).
368 Id. at 1.
369. Vagueness is intertwined with overbreadth but extends beyond the
First Amendment context. See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 9, at 859–61, 1030–31
(describing the “interplay of overbreadth and vagueness”).
370. 461 U.S. 352 (1983).
371. Id. at 358.
372. See id. (voiding for vagueness a California anti-loitering statute).
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subjective basis.”373[A1][GL2] Put another way, the legislature may
not delegate “the power to define punishable conduct” to the
police or others.374
Recent decisions emphasize that this concern with excessive
discretion extends beyond law enforcement to include
prosecutors375 and even judges.376 Vagueness is concerned with
both arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement, but particularly
enforcement based upon illegitimate criteria, or what I term here
selective prosecution. As Justice Jackson presciently warned
seventy years ago:
If the prosecutor is obliged to choose his cases, it follows that
he can choose his defendants . . . . With the law books filled
with a great assortment of crimes[,] . . . it is a question of
picking the man [rather than the offense] . . . . It is in this
realm—in which the prosecutor picks some person whom he
dislikes or desires to embarrass, or selects some group of
unpopular persons and then looks for an offense—that the
greatest danger of abuse of prosecuting power lies.377

373. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108–09 (1972) (noting
that vague laws delegate the basic policy matters and bring the “attendant
dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application”); see also Big Mama Rag Inc. v.
United States, 631 F.2d 1030, 1036 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (voiding a regulation for vagueness
where a key term was defined so broadly that state officials had no “objective
standard by which to judge which” groups applied and “the evaluation is made
solely on the basis of one’s subjective notion of what is ‘controversial’”).
374. See Peter W. Low & Joel S. Johnson, Changing the Vocabulary of
Vagueness, 101 VA. L. REV. 2051, 2053 (2015) (terming this the antidelegation
requirement of vagueness doctrine).
375. See Brief Amicus Curiae of Pacific Legal Foundation & Cato Institute
in Support of Neither Party at 2–3, Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358
(2010) (No. 08-1394) (raising concerns that prosecutors inappropriately choose
cases against individuals the prosecutor thinks should be punished rather than
choosing cases that are most harmful or best reflect the statutory definition of
the offense).
376. See Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2557 (2015) (noting that
the decision whether the residual clause covers a crime requires judges to
picture the kind of conduct that the crime involves in “the ordinary case”).
377 See Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 31 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 3, 5 (1941) (concluding that this makes law enforcement
personal and subject to political pressures). “Unpopular persons” are often racial
minorities and/or low-income people. See generally Davis, supra note 98
(arguing that prosecutorial discretion targets racial minorities and similar
unpopular individuals in society).
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In short, broad, vague laws invite prosecutions for reasons other
than the underlying harm.
Underenforcement
is
an
inevitable
product
of
overcriminalization378 and compounds selective prosecution,
creating what one scholar has termed “vagueness in practice.”379
Given a law that “covers something that (almost) everybody
does[,]” prosecutors can pick and choose whom to charge,
including those chosen based on another agenda.380 A central
principle of our system is that, so far as possible, the law on the
books matches the law on the streets.381 Broad and vague laws
criminalizing widespread behavior render unclear the line
between legal and illegal. In the modern world, criminal statutes
no longer function to define prohibited conduct, but rather serve
“as items on a menu from which the prosecutor may order as she
wishes.”382 Inevitable underenforcement means that a prosecutor
will choose to let many people violate the law, while sanctioning
others for the same conduct. She may pick and choose this way
while hiding substantive commitments, given the huge net of
vague and broad laws.
Racially biased enforcement is a particularly pernicious form
of selective prosecution. Several of the Supreme Court vagueness
decisions are in part efforts to limit racially discriminatory
enforcement by state and local police.383 Tellingly, the defendants
378. See Natapoff, Underenforcement, supra note 11, at 1747 (discussing
how underenforcement occurs when “the class of offenders is large”).
379. See Edward K. Cheng, Structural Laws and the Puzzle of Regulating
Behavior, 100 NW U. L. REV. 655, 660–61 (2006) (noting that low compliance
rates “ultimately degrade into a ‘sporting chance’ view of enforcement”); see also
HUSAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION, supra note 11, at 27 (recognizing that “[t]he
number and scope of criminal laws guarantee that neither police nor prosecutors
will [be able to] enforce statutes as written”).
380. See Beale, Overcriminalization, supra note 20, at 765, 758 (discussing
morals legislation and also noting that such broad and underenforced statutes
“invite use as a pretext”). Professor Beale points out that prosecutors often
charge crimes such as fornication and adultery in addition to more serious, and
much harder to prove, offenses such as rape. I discuss this practice in the
statutory rape context further at infra notes 458–466.
381. See Amsterdam, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine, supra note 35, at 89–
90 (discussing the importance of uniform enforcement and the difficulties
presented by subjective and vague laws).
382. William Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law’s Disappearing
Shadow, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2548, 2549 (2004).
383. See Jeffries, supra note 36, at 197 (noting that the Supreme Court
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arrested in Florida in Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville384
included two interracial couples, and the loitering ordinance in
Chicago in Chicago v. Morales385 resulted in over 30,000 arrests,
the vast majority of them African-American and Latino young
men. As Dorothy Roberts concludes, overly broad and vague laws
serve as “an invitation to police abuse,” which is particularly
problematic given that “police have a tendency to enforce the law
against groups that they despise.”386 This renders the
enforcement of such statutes not standardless, but worse, driven
by impermissible standards.387
Discretion is an enormous problem in peer statutory rape
given that virtually no guidelines exist for picking among the
millions of potential cases. The few criteria offered are highly
subjective and open to multiple interpretations that depend upon
the prosecutor’s or judge’s opinions about adolescent sex and
gender roles rather than a legislative definition or actual
culpability. For instance, the “predator”/“peer” distinction one
study identified turned exclusively on a prosecutor’s personal
assessment of a potential offender’s likelihood to marry their
underaged “victim”—a highly subjective and gendered criterion
and one that, at the time, excluded same-sex relationships.388
Similar to order-policing categories such as “visibly lawless”
people, “common sense” offenders is a prosecutorial construct
views racially discriminatory enforcement as a serious “danger”).
384. 405 U.S. 156 (1979).
385. 527 U.S. 41 (1999).
386. See Dorothy E. Roberts, Foreword: Race, Vagueness and the Social
Meaning of Order-Maintenance Policing, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 775, 782
(1999) (finding that ambiguous allocations of police discretion “unjustly burden
members of unpopular or minority groups”); see also Papachristou v. City of
Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 170 (1979) (recognizing that “[t]hose generally
implicated by the imprecise terms of the ordinance—poor people,
nonconformists, dissenters, idlers—may be required to comport themselves
according to the lifestyle deemed appropriate by the Jacksonville police and the
courts”).
387. See Post, Reconceptualizing Vagueness, supra note 13, at 496 (arguing
that “competent members of upstanding [white, “bourgeois”] Jacksonville society
could with confidence determine who was targeted by [the vagrancy ordinance
at issue in Papachristou] and who was not”).
388. See Levine, Intimacy, supra note 46, at 712–14, 722–23 (discussing the
absence of guidelines for prosecutors and the resulting policymaking power they
exercise).
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rather than a legitimate definition of the offense.389 This presents
the same problems that recently led the Supreme Court to strike
the Armed Career Criminal Act as void-for-vagueness in Johnson
v. United States.390 Like the assessment of crimes by sentencing
judges in Johnson, prosecutors’ and judges’ assessment of
elements such as a “material gap in maturity,” or even coercion,
are speculative and, in the latter case, not connected to the
statutory elements of the offense.
2. Limiting Excessive Criminal Law
Vague laws contribute to the mutually reinforcing harms of
selective enforcement and overcriminalization. The Supreme
Court has not explicitly connected the two until recently and even
now does so obliquely. Early vagueness cases, however, hint at a
concern with overcriminalization, particularly from the point of
view of chilling constitutional rights.
Two of the Court’s most recent vagueness cases more directly
reflect a concern with the broad overcriminalization of the
modern “carceral” state.391 In both Skilling v. United States392
and Yates v. United States,393 amici filed briefs arguing that the
laws at issue were overly broad and vague, and the defendants
raised these issues at oral argument.394 Interestingly, although
389. See Roberts, supra note 386, at 803–05 (making this argument about
the category of “visibly lawless” people the police attempted to use to justify
loitering arrests in Morales and noting the connection to racial stereotypes).
390. See 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2556–57 (2015) (finding that imposing an increased
sentence under the vague residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act
violates the Constitution’s due process guarantee).
391. Neither decision, however, explicitly turns on overcriminalization.
392. 561 U.S. 358 (2010).
393. 135 S. Ct. 1074 (2014).
394. In both cases, amici filed briefs. See Brief Amicus Curiae of Pacific
Legal Foundation & Cato Institute in support of Neither Party at 2–3, Skilling
v. United States, 561 U.S. 358 (2010) (No. 08-1394) (noting that “[t]here is
perhaps no statute more vague than the ‘honest services fraud’ statute”); see
also Brief for Eighteen Criminal Law Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioner at *6, Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074 (2014) (No. 13-7451)
[hereinafter Brief for Eighteen Criminal Law Professors] (“Redundancy,
however, is but one troubling consequence of the ever-growing criminal code.
Vagueness is another.”).
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both cases concerned sweeping statutes, the statutes addressed
white collar offenses rather than the street crimes at issue in
earlier vagueness cases.
Skilling was prosecuted for committing “honest services
fraud” while the Chief Executive Officer at Enron. His counsel
argued that, taken to its logical conclusion, the government’s
interpretation of “honest services fraud” would criminalize any lie
in the workplace.395 Chief Justice Roberts distinguished breadth
from vagueness, but as I argue below, this may be a distinction
without a real difference.396 The Court still used the vagueness
doctrine—or rather the doctrine of constitutional avoidance
grounded in concerns about unconstitutional vagueness—to
directly address Skilling’s claim of statutory overbreadth. It
construed the statute to have a very limited scope and to
criminalize only bribery and kickbacks, not any workplace
dishonesty.397
The Yates v. United States398 decision did not explicitly
mention vagueness, but the issue was raised in briefing and oral
argument.399 Todd Haugh has described how overcriminalization
concerns permeated the case.400 Yates, a fisherman, appealed his
conviction under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act for throwing undersized
grouper overboard after receiving a civil citation from a Fish and
Wildlife agent. The Act punishes the destruction of evidence and
was enacted in the wake of huge accounting scandals such as
395. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 26, Skilling v. United States, 561
U.S. 358 (2010) (No. 08-1394) (arguing the prosecution’s proposed interpretation
of the statute would “convert almost any lie in the workplace into an honest
services fraud prosecution”).
396. See id. at 28 (citing Chief Justice Robert’s point that the arguments
failed to address why the statute is vague, rather than broad). The vagueness
inquiry often includes an assessment of the statute’s breadth. See infra notes
406–408 (questioning sweeping, broad laws because of their tendency to target
“undesirables”).
397. See Skilling, 561 U.S. at 368 (finding that the alleged misconduct
entailed no bribe or kickback and therefore could not be reached by the statute).
398. 135 S. Ct. 1074 (2014).
399. See, e.g., Brief for Eighteen Criminal Law Professors, supra note 394, at
11, 15 (describing the federal criminal code as “overbroad” and containing many
“unclear” laws).
400. See Haugh, supra note 71, at 1193–95 (noting that the numerous amici
and the questions asked by the Justices were all tied to the overcriminalization
issue).
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Enron and WorldCom (hence the “white collar” label despite the
facts of Yates).401 Yates’ conviction could bring up to twenty years’
incarceration. Indeed, the government in Yates recommended a
sentence of about two years, although the judge disagreed and
sentenced him to thirty days.
Although the odd facts of the case led to frequent bursts of
laughter during the Supreme Court oral arguments,402 there is no
doubt that the breadth of the Act and its harsh sentences
illustrate over-criminalization at its worst. One amicus brief
explicitly connected the breadth and vagueness of the federal
code to over-criminalization and unchecked prosecutorial power,
arguing for a strict construction of criminal statutes to begin to
address this crisis.403 Several Justices indicated at oral argument
that they would not consider vagueness because it was not raised
in the court below; both Justices Breyer and Scalia, however,
noted the connection between the “incredibly expansive” statute’s
breadth and prosecutorial overcharging. 404
The majority opinion does not mention vagueness or
overcriminalization, but these concerns undoubtedly influenced
the awkward decision, which narrowly construed the statute to
prohibit only the destruction of records and reversed Yates’
conviction.405 As Justice Kagan notes in her dissent: “the real
issue” in Yates was the “deep[] pathology” of “overcriminalization
and excessive punishment.”406 She goes on to lament the “broad

401. See generally United States v. Andersen, 374 F.3d 281 (5th Cir. 2004)
(affirming Arthur Andersen’s conviction) rev’d, 544 U.S. 696 (2005).
402. See Haugh, supra note 71, at 1194 (noting that these facts led to
frequent laughter from the gallery).
403. See Brief for Eighteen Criminal Law Professors, supra note 394, at 10,
18 (arguing that the Court “should address problems of redundancy and
vagueness by construing criminal statutes strictly as required by fundamental,
constitutionally driven interpretive principles”).
404. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 17, 29, 36, Yates v. United States,
135 S. Ct. 1074 (2014) (No. 13-7451) (questioning a vagueness argument when
only the statute’s breadth appeared too “expansive”).
405. See Yates, 135 S. Ct. at 1079 (construing the term “tangible object” to
not include fish).
406. See id. at 1100–01 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court
should not be rewriting the law, even if it is overly broad as enacted by
Congress).
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and undifferentiated” criminal statutes that “give prosecutors too
much leverage and sentencers too much discretion.”407
Similarly, the immense net of peer statutory rape sweeps in a
huge amount of normal, non-culpable conduct. Of course, normal
is not the same as normative, and the criminal law can aspire to
deter bad behavior, even if widespread. I argue, however, that in
this instance the costs of criminalization far outweigh the
benefits. The realities of the juvenile justice system mean that
those few minors charged with peer statutory rape, almost
always a strict liability crime, have few resources to defend
themselves against a potential sex offender adjudication. Yet
many offenders may have done little more than displease the
parents of their consensual peer partner.
3. Curbing the Punitive State
Vagueness doctrine is a valuable tool to limit the harms of
overcriminalization, but it has been overlooked in recent debates.
Many courts and scholars contend that vagueness turns on the
specificity of statutory language.408 Perhaps because of this
narrow articulation of the doctrine, contemporary scholars have
largely ignored it as a meaningful check on the criminal justice
system’s abuses.409 Indeed, the brief consideration Stuntz gives
vagueness in his seminal account of over-criminalization suggests
that vague laws themselves—not the vagueness doctrine—can
help curb the criminal justice system’s excesses, and he argues
that the vagueness of criminal laws historically “left room for
juries and trial judges to decide cases based on their own moral
intuitions[,]” intuitions which sometimes benefitted defendants

407. See id. at 1101 (noting that such statutes are certainly “bad law”).
408. See, e.g., United States v. JDT, 762 F.3d 984, 1000–02 (9th Cir. 2014)
(reviewing the specific language in an aggravated sexual abuse statute); Solan,
supra note 31, at 143 (focusing on a judge’s analysis when a statute is
linguistically unclear). Unclear or under-defined language certainly contributes
to both the notice and selective enforcement harms against which the doctrine
protects. I argue here, however, that that is not the whole story.
409. Although overlooked by scholars, advocates have been robustly using
vagueness arguments, including in some of the peer statutory rape cases
discussed here, such as D.B. and J.D.T.
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against the state power.410 Important to this claim, admittedly, is
that the laws were vague and narrow, as opposed to the laws that
are both vague and broad like those I discuss here.411 Even with
this distinction, however, I argue that Stuntz’s account
underestimates vagueness doctrine’s usefulness.412
Scholars have persuasively demonstrated that courts
repeatedly void statutes for vagueness even where the statutory
language is very clear. 413 Indeed, the scope and malleability of
vagueness doctrine arguably render it a substantive rather than
procedural review.414 It accordingly gives courts tremendous
power to overturn legislative or executive branch judgments,
leading Amsterdam to term the doctrine a “means to an end.”415
Building on this work, Jeffries, Post, and other scholars in the
1980s and 1990s argued that the doctrine’s contextual analysis
enabled courts to eliminate laws that violate underlying rule of
law values.416

410. See STUNTZ, COLLAPSE, supra note 32, at 157 (emphasizing the
prosecutorial and judicial discretion inherently involved in vaguely written
statutes); see also id. at 303 (praising the “usually fuzzy boundaries” of criminal
liability, which allowed “judges and juries to exercise judgment when applying
those boundaries to individual cases”).
411. See id. at 257 (noting that the twentieth century saw an erosion of
narrowness and vagueness in American criminal law).
412. Also undermining this point is the current world of disappearing juries,
wherein prosecutorial delineation of boundaries is the key, if not sole,
determinant of liability.
413. Professors Low and Johnson provide a recent and valuable account. See
Low & Johnson, supra note 374, at 2076–78 (demonstrating that vagueness
reasoning was used to strike down an ordinance written in “crystal clear”
language); see also Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2556 (2015)
(ascertaining the vague definition of “violent felony” in the statute).
414. See Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 524 (1948) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting) (referencing Frankfurter’s famous description of the doctrine’s
“indefinite” nature).
415. See Amsterdam, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine, supra note 35 (titling
the introductory section of his Note “A Means to An End”). Amsterdam was a
key lawyer in the successful challenges to race-based enforcement of vagrancy
laws.
416. See Jeffries, supra note 36, at 196–201 (describing the void-forvagueness inquiry as “evaluative rather than mechanistic”); Post,
Reconceptualizing Vagueness, supra note 13, at 498 (noting that Papachristou
suggests that judgments that appeal for validation to middle class mores are
deemed “unconstitutionally arbitrary, vague, and unenforceable”).
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Central to this substantive vagueness inquiry are the scope
and purpose of the criminal law at issue.417 Vagueness differs
from First Amendment overbreadth analysis, but the scope of the
statute at issue has been a key factor in notable vagueness cases.
In Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville,418 the Court noted
vagrancy’s scope: “Here the net cast is large . . . to increase the
arsenal of the police.”419 Similarly in Chicago v. Morales,420 the
Court noted the immense sweep of the loitering statute and its
coverage of potential harmless activity.421
A wide scope alone is not fatal to the vagueness inquiry. Also
significant are the purposes to which state enforcement agents
will put that sweep to target unpopular individuals, and these
two seminal decisions both voiced the Court’s suspicion that these
broad criminal statutes were intended to entrap only certain
kinds of people, including those who protest against authority.422
This suspicion is similar to Justice Frankfurter’s condemnation of
vagrancy laws, because they were designed without boundaries
“to enable men to be caught who are vaguely undesirable in the
eyes of police and prosecution.”423 This is true even where those
caught might be potential or actual offenders of underlying harm,
like the gang members the Morales loitering statute aimed to
curb.424 As long as the broad net allows the state to sweep in too
417. See GOLUBOFF, VAGRANT NATION, supra note 14, at 135 (quoting
Amsterdam as saying that vague laws were the “weapons of the establishment
for keeping the untouchables in line”).
418. 405 U.S. 156 (1979)
419. See id. at 165 (finding that due process implications are equally
applicable to the particular vagrancy statute at issue).
420. 527 U.S. 41 (1999).
421. See id. at 52 (noting that the loitering ordinance “broadly [and with an
unclear scope] covers a significant amount of additional activity”).
422. See Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 166–67 (finding that “[w]here the list of
crimes is so all-inclusive and generalized . . . those convicted may be punished
for no more than vindicating affronts to police authority”); Morales, 527 U.S. at
55 (concluding that the statute was too vague and went far beyond simply
regulating “business behavior” and “contain[ing] a scienter requirement”).
423. See Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 540 (1948) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that “the “vagrancy statutes” and laws against “gangs” are
not fenced in by the text of the statute or by the subject matter so as to give
notice of conduct to be avoided”).
424. The statute’s covert enforcement purpose need not be explicitly
enumerated by the legislature, indeed this might be impossible to prove, but the
contextual analysis under vagueness doctrine allows for these inferences to be
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much innocent conduct, and do so on ill-defined and subjective
grounds, it is vulnerable to voiding. Just as procedural
investigation dragnets are unconstitutional, so are substantive
criminalization dragnets.
Through this lens, the vagueness doctrine allows courts to
monitor and curb the criminal law’s use for racialized social
control. Demonstrating this point, scholars have persuasively
argued that historic vagueness decisions arguably reflect a
judicial view that some values or norms “are not the kind of social
order, which the state may constitutionally authorize and
impose.”425 For instance, a central concern underlying the
Papachristou decision was that non-conformity with middle class
norms about interracial dating is an illegitimate basis for
criminal sanctions.426 Legal historian Risa Goluboff confirmed
this through archival research; prior versions of Justice Douglas’
draft opinion in the case included Ninth Amendment and
substantive due process liberty and equality analysis.427
The Court in Papachristou might have aimed to explicitly
limit what conduct could be criminalized as much as the
permissible specificity of statutory language to do so. But it did
not. Despite being the “poster child” for such limitations, the
Court chose the safer route of vagueness doctrine and
“Papachristou and its ilk became outliers rather than
trailblazers.”428 Papachristou, however, may still prove more than
an outlier; its purposeful constraint on state criminalization
echoes still.429 The opinion closes with ringing language about the
made.
425. See Post, Reconceptualizing Vagueness, supra note 13, at 507 (arguing
that the cases limit state control rather than turning on the “abstract clarity of
legal rules”).
426. See id. (noting the judicial discretion and control affected by resort to
the vagueness doctrine).
427. See Goluboff, Dispatch, supra note 37, at 1365–70 (remarking that the
early draft “reads as something of an anthem for the sixties’ celebration of
pluralism as both equality and personal liberty”).
428. See id. at 1376 (finding that Papachristou did not lead to a new
constitutional jurisprudence of criminal law).
429. My argument here is greatly informed by the analysis Low and
Johnson present in their recent article. See generally Low & Johnson, supra
note 374 (presenting a new framework for considering vagueness and more
broadly legality principle cases). Although I do not adopt their vocabulary, my
argument is consonant with their underlying point that vagueness allows for a
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underlying values of our system: “Of course, vagrancy statutes
are useful to the police. Of course, they are nets making easy the
roundup of so-called undesirables. But the rule of law implies
equality and justice in its application.”430
This legacy, and its “mirroring” of substantive due process, so
troubles Justice Thomas that he recently suggested the doctrine
may be invalid altogether. He spent most of a recent concurrence
describing how substantive due process has consistently “lurk[ed]
in the background” of vagueness decisions.431 Other
commentators have more favorably noted the greater concern
about over-criminalization suggested by Johnson. The spring
2015 opinion rejected the idea that a statute is void only if it is
vague in all applications; instead, a law can be void-for-vagueness
even if some conduct clearly falls within the statutory
language.432 As Carissa Byrne Hessick points out, this broad read
of the doctrine will likely render vagueness challenges more
successful in the future.433 Coupled with the consideration of
over-criminalization and statutory breadth in Skilling and Yates,
Johnson seems to indicate a renewed scrutiny of state coercion
under the doctrine’s cover.434
This state coercion takes a different form than the vagrancy
and loitering laws of the late twentieth century. Historically,
vagueness has been used primarily to void these and other
statutes prohibiting minor “street cleaning” offenses,435 yet it may
consideration of other, sometimes constitutional, values in construing or voiding
criminal law.
430. See Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 171 (1979)
(concluding that equal application of the law holds American society together).
431. See Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2572 (2015) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (discussing Morales as an example of a decision whereby the Court
uses indefinite concepts to invalidate democratically enacted laws).
432. See id. at 2556 (majority opinion) (distinguishing which crimes will fall
under the now unconstitutional residual clause in the Armed Career Criminal
Act).
433. See Hessick, supra note 42, at 310 (noting that Johnson may encourage
constitutional challenges to vague criminal statutes from both the judge’s and
the litigant’s perspectives).
434. See Armed Career Criminal Act, supra note 42, at 309 (noting that
underlying the case was the fundamental overcriminalization question of what
judges should do “when a flawed statute is sending offenders to prison for
[significant terms]”).
435. See Jeffries, supra note 36, at 215–16 (documenting the easy use of
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apply equally to more punitive or serious crimes, as the D.B. and
other decisions discussed above show. Just as the historic
offenses were “weapons of the establishment to keep the
untouchables in line,”436 much of the criminal justice system
operates as an establishment tool to enforce social control. This is
particularly true of widely under-enforced and largely harmless
vaguenet crimes like peer statutory rape. Repurposed for modern
times, the doctrine, in letter or spirit, may constitute what Stuntz
sought after all—a quasi-constitutional limit on the substantive
criminal law.437
Like vagrancy and loitering cases, peer statutory rape is used
to impose mainstream morals on adolescents considered “socially
undesirable.” Selectively punishing this widespread and largely
harmless conduct violates rule of law values and skews the
expressive message of the criminal law, “provid[ing] a misleading
[and too strict] impression of social norms.”438 A norm of
adolescent sexual abstinence is far too aspirational, and the
punishment of “untouchables” too harsh, for it to be enforced via
the criminal law.

******

This Part has argued that broad and under-defined laws like
peer statutory rape reflect the pathology of over-criminalization.
It also offers the vagueness doctrine, in letter or spirit, as a
valuable tool for addressing the harms of overcriminalization and
selective enforcement on illegitimate grounds. 439
such laws to “informal social control of undesirables”).
436. GOLUBOFF, VAGRANT NATION, supra note 14, at 135 (quoting Anthony G.
Amsterdam, Federal Constitutional Restrictions on the Punishment of Crimes of
Status, Crimes of General Obnoxiousness, Crimes of Displeasing Police Officers,
and the Like, 3 CRIM. L. BULL. 205, 233 n.4 (1967)).
437. See generally William J. Stuntz, Substance, Process, and the
Civil-Criminal Line, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 1 (1996) (arguing that the
Warren Court revolution in criminal procedure had the unintended consequence
of neglecting limits on the substantive criminal law, leaving overcriminalization
to flourished unchecked).
438. See ZIMRING, AMERICAN TRAVESTY, supra note 130, at 54 (arguing that
criminalizing largely harmless conduct is burdening our system and addressing
that burden will be vital for successful reform efforts).
439. As Jeffries pointed out, vagueness can provide good political cover for
underlying equality and liberty values. See Jeffries, supra note 36, at 218
(noting the doctrine’s “practical” use for enforcing these values in a “less
threatening way”).
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IV. A Decriminalization Proposal

In this Part, I propose the full decriminalization of peer
statutory rape or any sexual contact between two minors below
the age of consent. I first address the strongest rationales for
retaining peer statutory rape: to address the power imbalances
between young women and young men in negotiating sexual
activity, termed here the “feminist” rationale, and to serve as a
“safety net” to prosecute non-consensual or forcible rape, termed
here the “pragmatic” rationale.440 I contend that these rationales
risk entrenching gender stereotypes and covering for the system’s
failure to adequately address non-consensual and forcible rape.
Next, using peer statutory rape as a model, I posit a new
category of “offender-less harms,” societal problems for which no
one should be criminally sanctioned. The problems outlined
above—punishing widespread “normal” conduct and selective
enforcement on illegitimate grounds—make the criminal justice
system too blunt a tool for addressing issues like peer adolescent
sexuality.441
A. Rationales for Retaining Peer Statutory Rape
1. Feminist
Statutory rape has long been a hotly contested subject for
feminists.442 One group argues that the laws serve to control girls
440. These objections are related, as feminists who want to protect young
girls against coercion and vulnerability may also argue that the failures to
adequately prosecute non-consensual and forcible rape indicate the continuing
need for statutory rape laws. Indeed, Michelle Oberman makes both arguments.
See Oberman, Protection, Patriarchy, supra note 144, at 820 (describing
statutory rape laws as “an important tool for prosecutors”).
441. The decriminalization of peer statutory rape is also consistent with the
acknowledgment that juveniles are different than adults. See supra notes 124–
133 and accompanying text (discussing how children and adolescents are more
impulsive, less culpable, and more vulnerable than adults, which can have more
lasting consequences in the event of criminal convictions).
442. Feminism has many variations. I use it here broadly to describe a
theory about the subordination of female to male and a struggle against that
subordination. See JANET HALLEY, SPLIT DECISIONS: HOW AND WHY TO TAKE A
BREAK FROM FEMINISM 17–20 (2006) (outlining these debates); see also Frances
Olson, Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights Analysis, 63 TEX. L. REV.
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more than protect or help them, and that equality requires
treating boys and girls equally.443 Another group contends that
sex continues to be used to subjugate young women and that
consent is meaningless against the backdrop of patriarchal
society.444
Current discussions present a more nuanced view of
adolescent sexuality and incorporate the realities of the
increasing sexualization of girls even at very young ages.
Michelle Oberman is the leading expert warning against
abandoning statutory rape, arguing that adolescent girls are
more vulnerable than boys and that consent is complicated by
entrenched gender roles.445 She correctly points out that while
young people are incapable of consent in other contexts, such as
business deals, they are presumed to be autonomous actors in the
sexual realm.446 This gap she argues, ignores the emotional,
social, and other harms that can result from teenage sexual
activity.447 Oberman thoughtfully notes the problems with
gender-specific laws and does not endorse them, but nonetheless
posits statutory rape laws as a still valuable tool to protect girls
from peer exploitation and promote their autonomy.448 To
summarize, she defends selective enforcement, but on the
grounds of coercion and with reforms.
These are valid points; many adolescent girls remain more
vulnerable to sexual exploitation and less autonomous than their
male peers. Nonetheless, I argue that the cost of punishing peer
387 (1984) (same).
443. See, e.g., Wendy Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on
Culture, Courts, and Feminism, 7 WOMENS RTS. L. REP. 175 (1982) (criticizing
traditional gender roles).
444. See generally Catherine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality
Under Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281 (1991) (positing the intertwined nature of
sexual violence and women’s subordination).
445. See Michelle Oberman, Regulating Consensual Sex with Minors:
Defining a Role for Statutory Rape, 48 BUFF. L. REV. 703, 718–33 (2000)
[hereinafter Oberman, Regulating Consensual Sex] (outlining case studies of
non-voluntary adolescent sexual activity including intimidation and peer
pressure, acquiescence, naiveté, silence, and prior victimization).
446. See Oberman, Turning Girls into Women, supra note 46, at 71.
447. Id.
448. See id. at 78–79 (noting that no legal solution can eliminate the risks
inherent in sexual activity for girls).
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adolescent sexuality nonetheless outweigh its benefits for several
reasons.449 First, the concerns about female vulnerability obscure
the vulnerability of male and non-normative girl victims. As
outlined above, statutory rape historically protected only white,
middle class, chaste girls.450 It continues to ignore untraditional,
particularly male, victims.451 These are not problems that can be
fixed through tinkering with enforcement protocols. They are
literally built into the law—peer statutory rape’s gendered
history, breadth, and inevitable underenforcement mean that the
law will inevitably be applied in a biased manner.452
449. I argue this despite considering myself to be a feminist. See Oberman,
Regulating Consensual Sex, supra note 445, at 759 (noting that “no feminist
commentators would abolish statutory rape”). A third and related argument for
decriminalizing peer adolescent sex is that the threat of statutory rape
prosecution hinders the ability of all adolescents to mature and develop their
sexual autonomy. I agree with this argument but focus here on the particular
arguments about female adolescent sexuality.
450. See generally Olson, supra note 442 (discussing how feminists have
criticized this aspect of the Michael M. decision where the Justices did not
recognize the case as forcible rape, despite the evidence of physical violence and
non-consent, because the complainant “did not fit the ‘chaste and naïve’ image
associated with statutory rape victims”). I have also criticized this obscuration of
the forcible, non-consensual rape in Michael M. as part of a project rewriting
opinions from a feminist perspective. Cynthia Godsoe, Dissenting Opinion in
Michael M. v. Sonoma Cty, 450 U.S. 464 (1981) 262, 2n Feminist Judgments:
Rewritten Opinions of the United States Supreme Court (Kathryn M. Stanchi,
Linda L. Berger & Bridget J. Crawford eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2016)
(“None of [the justices] noted this pattern; indeed one suggests that Sharon’s
abuse was in part her fault. This attitude speaks volumes about our failure to
recognize the ongoing gender hierarchy in sexual relations and helps to explain
why rape remains the most underreported and under-convicted crime.”).
451. See Brenda Smith, Boys, Rape, and Masculinity: Reclaiming Boys’
Narratives of Sexual Violence in Custody, 93 N.C. L. REV. 1559, 1572 (2015)
(arguing that the normal conception of masculinity in society undermines efforts
to address male victims).
452. Scholars have called for decriminalization or decarceration based on
similar arguments about the inevitability of racial bias. See, e.g., Dorothy E.
Roberts, Constructing a Criminal Justice System Free of Racial Bias: An
Abolitionist Framework, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 261, 262–66 (2007)
(asserting that racial bias is foundational to the U.S. criminal justice system
and calling for the abolition of law enforcement policies that promote “mass
imprisonment, capital punishment, and police terror”). Because control of
marginalized groups is a key function of the criminal justice system, racial,
sexual, and gender minorities will continue to be disproportionately targeted.
See id. at 265 (“Given the function of crime control in most societies, as a key
component of social policy aimed at governing marginal groups, we can expect
that racial bias is inevitable as long as white supremacy reigns in the United
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Second, enshrining female vulnerability in the law has
expressive costs as well. The dual purposes of protection and
patriarchy are difficult, if not impossible, to uncouple.453 Focusing
on female victimhood and vulnerability risks perpetuating
socially constructed gender differences, and ultimately,
inequality.454
2. Pragmatic
Probably the most frequent argument in support of peer
statutory rape is its use to prosecute “real” rape, i.e. forcible or
non-consensual rape.455 There is no doubt that despite advances
in the prosecution and punishment of rape in recent decades, it
remains a very difficult crime to prosecute. Reporting, charging,
and conviction rates are among the lowest for any crime. This
reflects the evidentiary challenges in proving non-consensual

States.”). Oberman also seems to acknowledge the complex or dual nature of
protectionist rationales for statutory rape by noting the crime’s dual historical
purposes, one “protective and unquestionably legitimate . . . the other
patriarchal and undeniably pernicious.” Oberman, Protection, Patriarchy, supra
note 144, at 800.
453. See generally Godsoe, Punishment as Protection, supra note 50
(examining the tension between punishment and protection for underage
prostituted girls who are below the age of consent yet are frequently prosecuted
for prostitution rather than treated as victims under statutory rape and
trafficking laws).
454. Scholars have described these problems in the dynamic of abortion and
rape, as well as the victim narrative’s contributions to overcriminalization. See,
e.g., Jeannie Suk, The Trajectory of Trauma: Bodies and Minds of Abortion
Discourse, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1123 (2010); Aya Gruber, Rape, Feminism and
the War on Crime, 84 WASH. L. REV. 581 (2009).
455. As noted earlier, the only statutory rape case to reach the Supreme
Court, between two peers, was actually a forcible rape case. See Michael M. v.
Superior Court of Sonoma Cty, 450 U.S. 464, 481 n.13 (1981) (Stewart J.,
concurring) (detailing how the victim in this case said “no” and was struck in the
face repeatedly). Statutory rape is also used to prosecute other sex crimes
against young people, including child pornography and trafficking. See, e.g.,
Ariel Rothfield, Kansas City Man Charged with Statutory Rape of Teenage
Runaway, KHSB (Nov. 17, 2016) (last visited Mar. 1, 2017) (reporting that the
defendant could have been charged with child pornography or sex trafficking
that bring much higher penalties) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review). This is problematic for the same reasons as its use to punish nonconsensual rape.
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rape.456 Even more significantly, it demonstrates the ongoing
gendered and highly charged nature of the crime, and the
ongoing gatekeeping by law enforcement and prosecutors based
on illegitimate factors such as a victim’s chastity and force, and
the assessment by juries and judges of cases according to
preexisting rape “scripts.”457
Michelle Anderson, Bennett Capers, and others have pointed
out that rape victims continue to be scrutinized and
non-normative victims to face particular challenges.458
Accordingly, things have changed surprisingly little since 1977
when Roman Polanski was famously prosecuted only for
statutory rape after he drugged and had non-consensual sex as
rape of a thirteen-year-old girl.459 Many prosecutors’ offices have
policies prioritizing prosecution of coercive cases, and forcible or
non-consensual rape cases are routinely reduced to statutory rape
cases where the victim is underage.460 A very recent example of
this use of statutory rape to punish non-consensual rape is the
high profile prosecution of a Saint Paul’s boarding school student.
He was acquitted on non-consensual felony rape charges and
convicted only of misdemeanor statutory rape charges.461
456. See Katherine K. Baker, Why Rape Should Not (Always) Be A Crime,
100 MINN. L. REV. 221, 235–44 (2015) (documenting these difficulties while also
noting the constructions of rapists and victims that permeate adjudications of
the offense).
457. See Anderson, supra note 178 (describing the narratives that posit
interracial stranger rape as the only true rape, diminishing the harm of the
much more common intraracial acquaintance rape).
458. See id. at 644 (“[R]ape law often condemns females who are not chaste
and excuses males who act with sexual entitlement.”); Capers, supra note 280,
at 1288 n.195–98 (discussing how the failure of cases to adhere to normative
rape scripts can lead courts to reverse convictions).
459. See generally SAMANTHA GEIMER, THE GIRL: A LIFE IN THE SHADOW OF
ROMAN POLANSKI (2014) (providing the victim’s autobiography).
460. See Levine, Intimacy, supra note 46, at 719 (“Quasi-forcible rapes have
long been the mainstay of statutory rape prosecutions.”); see also Monica
Vaughan, Rape Case Becomes Misdemeanor in Yuba County, APPEAL-DEMOCRAT
NEWS (Jul. 21, 2015), http://www.appeal-democrat.com/news/rape-case-becomesmisdemeanor-in-yuba-county/article_15de2322-3019-11e5-a766db3999ad1044.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2017) (describing a case of forcible rape,
which was reduced to statutory rape) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
461. Jess Bidgood, Owen Labrie of St. Paul’s School is Found Not Guilty of
Main
Rape
Charge,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Aug.
28,
2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/29/us/st-pauls-school-rape-trial-owen-labrie.
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A number of the statutory rape prosecutions discussed above
include facts that indicate forcible or non-consensual rape, such
as G.T., and/or originally included other rape charges that were
dismissed or dropped, as in D.B. Although this widespread
practice is undoubtedly a valuable prosecution tool, it perpetuates
a failure to adequately address forcible and non-consensual
rape.462 These crimes usually carry greater penalties than
statutory rape, as well as more societal stigma. Allowing
prosecutors to take the easy route of proving a strict liability
crime such as statutory rape significantly negates their
incentives to prove the real offense.
More broadly, the transparency and legitimacy of the
criminal system require that harms be appropriately recognized
and addressed. Costs to pre-textual prosecutions, even those used
to address hard-to-convict offenders, include inequity, a lack of
procedural justice, and the erosion of the rule of law.463 In sum,
using the overinclusive strict liability tool of statutory rape
obscures the scope of other types of rape and, relatedly, the
system’s failure to punish it.
B. Offender-less Harms
Having concluded that the two strongest rationales for peer
statutory rape cannot justify its costs, in this Section, I call for
full decriminalization. There is a growing recognition among both
scholars and policymakers that not all societal problems can or
should be addressed via the criminal law. As a result, there have
been numerous proposals to decriminalize certain offenses. These
have focused almost exclusively on “victimless” crimes such as
drug offenses.464 Although there has been some diversion of
html?_r=0 (last visited Mar. 6, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
462. Relatedly, I have argued here that prosecutors do not wield
discretionary tools wisely. Their decisions to charge or accept a plea to statutory
rape rather than more severe forms of rape will likely be influenced by many of
the same illegitimate criteria described above.
463. See Litman, supra note 79, at 1149–58 (discussing the inequity
introduced by prosecutorial biases when prosecutions are based on alternative
or pretextual charges rather than the charge that best fits the crime).
464. Victimless crimes are defined as “those where individual adults engage
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violent offenses to specialized courts, criminal sanctions remain
the backdrop.465
I posit here a new category of offender-less harms, societal
harms for which no one should be criminally sanctioned. Sexual
activity between two consenting peers presents an archetypal
instance of an offender-less harm. The overcriminalization and
related selective enforcement concerns detailed above underlie
this proposal. Although scholars have recommended reforming
statutory rape, I am alone in advocating for a complete
decriminalization of consensual sexual activity between minors.
This recommendation also goes further than the proposed MPC
or the current law in almost every state.466 Let me be clear about
what I am not arguing. I am not calling for the abolition of
statutory rape; there needs to be a line where the coercive
potential of a sexual relationship with an adult is criminalized.
Nor am I arguing for the abolition of other peer sexual crimes
such as non-consensual or forcible rape.
One of the most difficult issues in thinking about peer
statutory rape is whether adolescent peer sex is harmful. Sex
among preteens and teenagers remains a very sensitive issue for
many adults. Indeed, when discussing this piece with other legal
scholars, one of the most frequent questions I was asked was
“would you want your child aged [12 or 14] to be having sex?”
This is the wrong question to be asking in terms of the law,
particularly the criminal law.467 The criminal law should not be
used to enforce parental norms, particularly in such an
underinclusive and biased way. Supporting this argument is
Bernard Harcourt’s persuasive argument that the criminal
justice system has abandoned a meaningful harm principle,
in conduct that inflicts only harm to self or to other consenting adults, but not
on third parties. These victimless crimes include prostitution, pornography,
sadomasochism, gambling, and most notably, drug crimes.” HUSAK,
OVERCRIMINALIZATION, supra note 11, at 154.
465. For instance, defendants diverted to domestic violence courts usually
have to plead guilty before they are diverted.
466. See infra Appendix A (outlining the treatment of statutory rape
exceptions under the Model Penal Code and the laws of the states).
467. This is less true of other areas of the law, such as family law. For
instance, a parent’s attitude towards their child’s sexual development could be
relevant to a custody determination where courts use a “best interests of the
child” standard.
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rendering virtually any act “harmful” to society and thus
criminally prohibited.468
Moreover, as the medical evidence outlined above
demonstrates, most consensual peer sexual activity is not
harmful.469 There are of course some physical risks, particularly
from intercourse, including pregnancy and sexually transmitted
diseases. There are, however, much more direct and less harmful
ways to address these risks, including education and
contraception. Scholars and policymakers point to the increased
likelihood of non-consensual sex at this age,470 but criminalizing
all peer sexual activity for this reason is both overbroad and, as I
noted above, non-consensual sex is already criminalized.
Even conceding potential harm in some cases, the recognition
that the criminal law should not be used to impose moral
standards further militates against the use of peer statutory rape
to enforce aspirational sexuality standards.471 To be clear, I am
not arguing here that minors have a protected liberty interest in
intimate (sexual) relations.472 Lawrence v. Texas473 explicitly
excludes minors from its holding and the state does, and should,
have greater reach to regulate conduct of minors than adults.
Nonetheless, the law’s treatment of minor sexuality should be
informed by changing norms and real world prevalence, rather
468. See Bernard Harcourt, The Collapse of the Harm Principle, 90 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 109, 109–10 (1999) (discussing the collapse of meaningful
“harm principle” in criminal law as alleged social harms are increasingly
invoked in the place of morals in the regulation of vice). This dynamic has
contributed to the overcriminalization phenomenon.
469. See supra notes 346–355 and accompanying text (outlining research on
the normalcy and medical acceptance of adolescent and pre-adolescent sexual
activity).
470. See, e.g., Oberman, Turning Girls into Women, supra note 46, at 71
(“On some occasions, a girl may consent to sex which is exploitative, degrading,
demeaning, and harmful to her. But the law does not recognize it as rape.”).
471. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (“The State cannot
demean their existence or control their destiny by making their private sexual
conduct a crime.”).
472. Some courts have articulated this right in peer statutory rape cases.
See In re G.T., 758 A.2d 301, 309 (Vt. 2000) (“[T]o avoid the real possibility of
discriminatory enforcement and interference with the privacy rights of
defendant and the asserted victim, we construe subsection (a)(3) as inapplicable
in cases where the alleged perpetrator is also a victim under the age of
consent.”).
473. 539 U.S. 558 (2008).
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than outdated or ideal notions. One state high court recognized
this in finding that penalizing statutory rape sodomy more
harshly than statutory rape vaginal intercourse failed even
rational review.474 The court discounted the State’s arguments
that gay sex leads to a higher rate of sexually transmitted
infections because there was no scientific basis for their
arguments, and held that “moral disapproval of a group cannot be
a legitimate governmental interest.”475 The fact that the state
regulation here is punitive of the minors themselves further
delegitimizes a moralistic impetus.
Decriminalization brings some hard cases. I discuss two here
briefly, but still argue for full decriminalization. The first is a
case involving a minor close to the age of consent and a young
adult, for instance a fifteen-year-old and an eighteen-year-old.
This pattern is very common and is best addressed by the MPC
proposal, and the age gap laws in numerous states, that penalize
liability only within a certain range of the minor’s age.476 If that
were three or four years, then there would be no prosecution here
or in fact for anyone below twenty. The age of consent still
matters because the seventeen to twenty-year-olds are not
victims but this would take into account the continuum of
development, both physical and emotional, rather than focusing
entirely on a bright-line rule age of consent.
The most difficult scenario involves a very young child and an
older child also below the age of consent. This could take the form
of a fifteen-year-old and a nine-year-old, or a ten-year-old and a
four-year-old. There are likely significant physical and emotional
differences between these two minors, which may result in an
increased risk of exploitation by the older child. Nonetheless, the
medical evidence, for instance the preclusion of a diagnosis of
pedophilia below age sixteen, as well as the wide range of normal
sexual development militate, towards decriminalization of this
474. See State v. Limon, 122 P.3d 22, 35 (Kan. 2005) (“[U]nless the
justifications for criminalizing homosexual activity between teenagers more
severely than heterosexual activity between teenagers are somehow different
than the justifications for criminalizing adult homosexual activity, those
justifications must fail.”).
475. Id.
476. See infra Appendix A (outlining the treatment of statutory rape age gap
exceptions under the Model Penal Code and the laws of the states).
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situation as well. Moreover, carving out exceptions for peers
below the age of consent would risk the selective enforcement and
over-criminalization outlined above. This is not to say that
parents cannot access other resources, such as mental health
treatment, to address this conduct. At least one court has
followed this reasoning and interpreted the D.B. decision to
dismiss a delinquency petition as vague as applied to the case of
an eleven-year-old who had oral sex with a four-year-old, both
under the thirteen-year-old age of consent.477
One final point merits consideration. Why is full
decriminalization—including quasi-criminal systems such as
status offender system—required? Put another way, why are
proposals like the MPC draft that significantly curtail peer
liability not sufficient? Michele Goodwin recently explored
addressing statutory rape outside the criminal justice system
through alternative courts or private sector markets.478 Many of
the rationales motivating Goodwin’s proposal are the same as
those expressed here, including harsh punishment, and
disproportionate prosecutions of class, gender and, particularly,
racial minorities.479 Her proposal, however, is narrower than
mine in two significant ways. First, she focuses primarily on
adolescents rather than all minors—for instance not considering
those under the lower age of consent of ten or twelve.480 Second,
Goodwin also posits alternative courts as a potential remedy to
peer statutory rape problems, praising the fact that judges in
these courts “are not bound by legislative mandates” and can
477. In re D.R., Case No. 12 MA 16, 2012 WL 5842773 at *20 (Ohio Ct. App.
Nov. 14, 2012) (“As applied to children under the age of 13 who engage in sexual
conduct with other children under the age of 13, R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b) is
unconstitutionally vague because the statute authorizes and encourages
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” (citing In re D.B., 950 N.E.2d 528
(Ohio 2011))).
478. See Goodwin, Law’s Limits, supra note 46, at 530–39 (exploring various
market initiatives to alter adolescent behavior in other areas, as well as the
potential benefits of using of alternative courts instead of traditional criminal
prosecution).
479. Id. at 483, 526, 513–23 (discussing disparate rates of adolescent sexual
activity according to various demographic factors).
480. My analysis also differs considerably in focusing on the vague
designation of victims and offenders and positing vagueness doctrine as a
valuable tool for courts to reform this area.
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thus “prioritize a focus on the children involved . . . and
maximizing welfare.”481
I am much more skeptical of broad mandates and judicial
discretion, particularly for those tasked with children’s best
interests.482 Juvenile court was the original alternative court and,
as outlined above, its broad sweep and lack of constraints have
led experts to call for its abolition.483 In at least one peer
statutory rape case, the judge relied on the juvenile court’s
mandate for “rehabilitative or educational” interventions to
adjudicate a young boy guilty and sentence him to probation
including restrictive special conditions.484 Alternative courts may
bring milder sanctions than the criminal justice system but risk
net-widening and potentially compounding the selective
enforcement and policing of widespread behavior.485 These
concerns underlie recent efforts to reform or eliminate status
offense jurisdiction. Status offenses have been robustly used to
justify virtually unchecked intervention into the lives of minors
and families, and to harshly punish girls in particular for
non-normative sexual behavior.486 Concern over the ongoing
widespread incarceration of minors for status offenses has led to
481. Goodwin, Law’s Limits, supra note 46, at 539.
482. I have previously critiqued this discretion. See generally Godsoe,
Punishment as Protection, supra note 50; Godsoe, Contempt, supra note 110
(discussing discretionary courts’ imposition of disparate punishment across
social groups and arbitrary classifications of girls as victims or offenders).
483. See, e.g., Feld, Abolish the Juvenile Court, supra note 114.
484. In re TC, 214 P.3d 1082, 1087, 1097–98 (Haw. Ct. App. 2009).
485. See Goodwin, Law’s Limits, supra note 46, at 537–40 (positing
alternative courts, including girls’ courts, as a potential option for state
oversight of teen sex). My argument is also informed by, but goes further than,
that of Carissa Hessick and Judith Stinson that juveniles be sanctioned less
severely than adults for age-determinative sex offenses, including the possible
use of status offense jurisdiction rather than criminalization. See generally
Carissa Byrne Hessick & Judith M. Hinson, Juveniles, Sex Offenses, and the
Scope of Substantive Law, 46 TEX. TECH L. REV. 5 (2013) (arguing that juvenile
perpetrators of age-determinative sex offenses lack the characteristics of adult
offenders that enhance adult culpability).
486. See Barry C. Feld, Violent Girls or Relabeled Status Offenders, 55
CRIME & DELINQ. 241, 242 (2009) (examining the criminalization of status
offenses to justify court intervention into the lives of girls); see also Godsoe,
Contempt, supra note 110, at 1109–10 (outlining recent cases adjudicating girls
as status offenders because of dating and sexual behavior of which their parents
did not approve).
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proposed amendments to federal legislation governing juvenile
justice to eliminate this practice.487
In sum, the problems with peer statutory rape are built into
the law. Eliminating discretion in one place usually causes it to
reappear elsewhere; the question thus becomes who should
exercise it and how to channel and curb the inevitable
discretion.488 I argue here that no state actor should have the
discretion to punish consensual peer sex. Only full
decriminalization will eliminate these problems.
V. Conclusion
Over-criminalization is an enormous problem. Here, I have
addressed just one of its many forms. Decriminalizing peer
statutory rape may only affect a few hundred minors every year—
a drop in the bucket of our immense carceral state. For those
children, however, the stakes are immensely high. Hopefully, this
proposal will spur conversation about the broader overcriminalization of juveniles, and encourage reformers and
scholars to revisit vagueness as a potential tool.
This examination of the vaguenet of peer statutory rape also
raises questions about one of the most deeply entrenched legal
classifications—victim and offender. Almost always assumed as a
factual or statutory given, this binary is in fact partially socially
constructed through the law’s enforcement. Like Michel
Foucault’s category of the “disorderly,” the victim and offender
categories are more subjective, and more problematic, than
conventional wisdom acknowledges.489
487. See, e.g., S. 1169, 114th Cong. (2015). The proposed legislation has
brought widespread criticism of the incarceration of at-risk or acting out minors.
See, e.g., Editorial, Kids and Jails: A Bad Combination, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 28,
2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/29/opinion/kids-and-jails-a-bad-combi
nation.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2016) (lauding proposed reform to the Juvenile
Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act targeted to reduce incarceration of
minors) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
488. See Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public
Places: Courts, Communities, and the New Policing, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 551, 593–
94 (1997) (noting the shortcomings of vagueness doctrine).
489. See generally MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF
THE PRISON (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 2d ed. 1995) (1977).
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Other crimes reflect the complexity of this designation. I will
flag just two here. First are so-called mutual liability crimes. One
example is the category of intimate partner violence, which is
sometimes designated ‘mutual combat’ where both parties are
prosecuted. Second is conduct governed by overlapping and
sometimes contradictory statutes. A person can be charged with
prostitution under one law and be a trafficking victim under
another. These examples call for scrutiny of who makes the
designation—Police? Prosecutors? Judges or juries?—and on
what grounds. They also raise questions about the antipodal
nature of these designations—should they function as an all-ornothing on/off switch as they currently do? Or might a continuum
of victimhood and criminal liability work better? I do not purport
to answer these questions here. Instead, I raise them to
encourage further critical thinking, for accurately and
transparently deciding who has been harmed and who deserves
punishment lie at the heart of any fair and legitimate criminal
justice system
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